Understanding worry and mindfulness through psycholinguistics. by Bortoleto, Elena Maria Clara Geronimi
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
12-2019 
Understanding worry and mindfulness through psycholinguistics. 
Elena Maria Clara Geronimi Bortoleto 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bortoleto, Elena Maria Clara Geronimi, "Understanding worry and mindfulness through psycholinguistics." 
(2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3328. 
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/3328 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of 
the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 




Elena Maria Clara Geronimi Bortoleto 
B.A., University of Rio de Janeiro, 2004 
B.A., University of Louisville, 2011 






Submitted to the Faculty of the 
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  








Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences 







Copyright 2019 by Elena Maria Clara Geronimi Bortoleto 






UNDERSTANDING WORRY AND MINDFULNESS THROUGH 
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 
By 
Elena Maria Clara Geronimi Bortoleto 
B.A., University of Rio de Janeiro, 2004 
B.A., University of Louisville, 2011 
M.A., University of Louisville, 2015 
 
 













Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph.D. 
 
______________________________ 
Paul Salmon, Ph.D. 
 
_______________________________ 
Richard Lewine, Ph.D. 
 
_______________________________ 
Marci DeCaro, Ph.D. 
 
_______________________________ 





This dissertation is dedicated to my family; words do not allow me to transcribe my 
feelings and gratitude. Laura and Rafael have provided me continuous immensurable 





 I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Janet Woodruff-Borden, for her constant 
guidance, and conceptual expertise throughout this process.  I would also like to thank the 
other committee members, Dr. Paul Salmon, Dr. Richard Lewine, Dr. Marci DeCaro, and 
Dr. Kathryn Barten Whitmore, for their invaluable insight over the past four years and 
throughout the completion of this dissertation. I would also like to express my deepest 








UNDERSTANDING WORRY AND MINDFULNESS THROUGH 
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 
Elena Maria Clara Geronimi Bortoleto 
April 15, 2019 
Our understanding of psychological constructs through language has increased 
over the last few decades. However, only a few studies have explored linguistic features 
associated with worry and mindfulness. This is the first study using linguistics to 
investigate features of worry models associated with worry and mindfulness 
concomitantly. The current study reviews literatures regarding worry and mindfulness 
emotional, physiological, and cognitive features, including language. Next, the current 
study tested the hypotheses that excessive worry would be negatively correlated with 
present tense and positively correlated with number of words, number of questions, 
anxiety related words, and negative emotion words, while mindfulness would be 
positively correlated with present tense and negatively correlated with number of words, 
number of questions, anxiety related words, and negative emotion words. Further, the 
hypotheses that worry writing activity would be higher than neutral writing activity in 
number of words, number of questions, anxiety related words, and negative emotion 
words, and that worry writing activity would be lower than the neutral writing activity in 
present tense were also tested. In order to evaluate these hypotheses, 46 predominantly 
European American women were recruited from the community to complete self-report 
questionnaires and worry and neutral writing tasks. Results of the present 
investigation suggest that word categories related to emotions (i.e., anxiety and negative 
emotion words) hold associations with worry and mindfulness. Number of words, 
questions, and present tense did not reveal an association with worry and mindfulness 
levels in the present sample. Further, compared to a neutral task, worry activity had 
higher use of present tense, anxiety-related words, and negative emotion words. The 
findings may reflect avoidance of emotional content in those higher in worry and lower in 
mindfulness and acceptance of emotional experience by those lower in worry and higher 
in mindfulness. Future research should continue exploring linguistic features of worry 
and mindfulness in order to establish the relevant linguistic variables associated with 
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Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) has a high prevalence rate; approximately 
5% 
 of people will develop GAD during their lifetime (APA, 2013). The fundamental feature 
of GAD is exaggerated, chronic worry that is accompanied by other cognitive and 
physical symptoms such as sleep problems, difficulty concentrating, and fatigue (APA, 
2013). Previous studies have shown that those with GAD experience functional and 
psychosocial difficulties, are more likely to need heath care services (e.g., Greenberg et 
al., 1999; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994), and experience low levels of quality 
of life (Henning, Turk, Mennin, Fresco, & Heimberg, 2007). 
 Several theoretical models of worry have been proposed that focus on its 
prominent emotional, physiological, and cognitive features (see Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, 
Mohlman, & Staples, 2009 for a detailed review of theoretical models of worry). These 
models suggest that worry presents as a barrier to fully experiencing the present moment; 
that is, worry works as an experiential buffer that prevents the experience of intense 
emotions and physiological arousal. The difficulty in accepting present experience in 
pathological worry, and consequently the use of maladaptive strategies (physiological, 
emotional, and cognitive; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 
2002; Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996) are key in perpetuating the worry cycle. In 
particular, physiological, emotional, and cognitive factors seem to interact in establishing 
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this barrier that creates distance from immediate experiences, especially those 
encompassing negative emotions (Behar, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005). More specifically, 
in worrisome states, feared stimuli are avoided in the present moment through the use of 
verbal cognitive activity which has been associated with lower autonomic modulation 
and poorer emotional processing (Borkovec, 1994). According to the Avoidance Model 
of Worry, worry is primarily a verbal sequence of thoughts that prevents imagery content 
from entering consciousness, and thus buffers autonomic arousal (Borkovec, 1994). 
However, despite the fact that innumerous studies provide support to its verbal nature 
(e.g., Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec & Inz, 1990), very little is known about the specific 
verbal patterns associated with worry. Given that language provides subtle cues about 
cognitive and emotional patterns, psycholinguistics could provide important insights into 
the worry activity and broaden our understanding of this phenomenon. However, to date, 
only two studies examined psycholinguistic features in individuals with GAD and worry 
activity (Geronimi & Woodruff-Borden, 2015; Molina, Borkovec, Peasley, & Person, 
1998).  
 Current conceptualizations of worry stand in direct contrast with the construct of 
mindfulness which has been defined as an attitude of non-judgmentally focusing attention 
and being aware of internal and external aspects of the present moment without engaging 
in further elaborations or reactions (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 
1992) which contrasts with the future orientation characteristic of worrisome states as 
well as negative judgments made about internal experiences while worrying (Geronimi & 
Woodruff-Borden, 2015; Wells, 1999). Thus, a mindful state enables one to fully 
experience the present moment. This ability to be present with whatever arises at a given 
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point contrasts with the difficulty in fully engaging in present moment experiences in 
worrisome states; indeed, mindfulness has been found to be an effective intervention in 
treating worry (e.g., Craigie, Rees, Marsh, & Nathan, 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). 
Specific physiological, emotional, and cognitive patterns have been associated with 
mindfulness; such patterns are antagonistic in relation to those found in worry. For 
instance, mindfulness states are characterized by more flexible physiological patterns and 
a better ability to regulate emotions (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 
2007; Vlemincx, Vigo, Vansteenwegen, Van den Bergh, & Van Diest, 2013).  
As such, mindfulness could be used as a way to explain and understand 
maladaptive patterns that occur during worry, given that, in relation to worry, it presents 
as a contrasting state where elements constituting worry states (e.g., emotion and 
physiology) present in an adaptive, balanced form.  Indeed, alterations in these domains 
have been identified as mechanisms of change in mindfulness interventions for worry 
(e.g., Delgado-Pastor et al., 2015; Delgado et al., 2010; Erisman & Roemer, 2010). 
However, less is known about cognitive mindfulness features that could be effective in 
treating worry (e.g., the internal cognitive dialog characteristic of mindful states; 
mindfulness relation to cognitive factors associated with worry, such as intolerance of 
uncertainty - IU, described below). Understanding the psycholinguistic patterns 
associated with mindfulness could be particularly important in understanding such 
features. However, to date only two studies have explored linguistic patterns associated 
with mindfulness (e.g., Collins et al., 2009; Moore & Brody, 2009).  
 Given the verbal nature of worry (e.g., Behar et al., 2005) and the immediate 
access it provides into psychological states (Rude, Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004; Stirman 
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& Pennebaker, 2001), linguistics presents the ideal tool for investigating the internal 
dialog characteristic of worried and mindful states. As aforementioned, several features 
of worry and mindfulness are contrasting (e.g., physiological, emotional; Feldman et al., 
2007; Mennin et al., 2002; Thayer et al., 1996; Vlemincx et al., 2013), and understanding 
how these features are manifested linguistically will be important in elucidating these 
constructs and in informing mindfulness interventions for worry. Similar to other areas of 
psychopathology, in which language has been important in understanding cognitive 
processes (e.g., depression; Rude et al., 2004), exploring how worry and mindfulness are 
manifested linguistically will be essential in better understanding these constructs 
cognitively. Furthermore, as mindfulness presents a distinct, healthier psychological state 
in relation to worry, establishing how these constructs differ linguistically will be 
important in delineating the possible cognitive shifts necessary for one to transition from 
a worrisome to a mindfulness state.  Thus, the present study aims to explore the 
linguistics associated with both worry and mindfulness, as it relates to worrisome states, 
in order to establish a better understanding of cognitive aspects of worry, especially the 
internal dialog that takes place during this state. This study will also support and expand 
on findings about the contrasting nature of worry and mindfulness in other areas, such as 
emotion and physiology (Feldman et al., 2007; Mennin et al., 2002; Thayer et al., 1996; 
Vlemincx et al., 2013). In addition, similar to intervention research in these areas (e.g., 
Delgado et al., 2010), this study will provide an empirical foundation for identifying 
possible cognitive mechanisms of change in mindfulness-based interventions for worry. 
Given that GAD is defined by excessive and uncontrollable worry (APA, 2013), not only 
the worry literature, but also relevant literature related to GAD will be reviewed. 
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Worry and GAD: Verbal Nature and Conceptual Models 
The Verbal Nature of Worry 
Worry has been conceptualized primarily as a verbal mental process with a high 
frequency of language-based thought and low frequency of imagery, a pattern that has 
been supported in several studies (Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston, 
Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996; Hirsch, Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012). 
Freeston et al. (1996) found that, when asked to characterize their worry, participants 
identify a higher frequency of thoughts (70.4%) as opposed to images (24.8%). In 
addition, excessive worriers tend to report higher percentages of thoughts compared to 
low worriers (Freeston et al., 1996).  
Using a different method and a clinical sample, Borkovec and Inz (1990) asked 
participants to engage in worry and relaxation. During relaxation, controls reported 
higher frequency of imagery over thoughts while individuals with GAD reported equal 
amount of imagery and thoughts. In addition, during worry, both groups reported higher 
frequency of thoughts, and after receiving treatment, individuals with GAD reported a 
decrease in thought activity during relaxation. These findings suggest that thought 
activity characterizes both worry activity and individuals who have GAD. Hirsch et al. 
(2012) conducted a similar study; however, they assessed for both frequency and duration 
of images during worry and thinking about a positive topic. In addition, they also 
assessed participants more frequently during the tasks. Regarding imagery occurrence, 
the GAD group reported fewer images than the control group and fewer images occurred 
when worrying than when thinking about a positive topic. There was also a significant 
interaction for imagery occurrence, such that fewer images were reported by the GAD 
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group during the worry condition but there were no differences in number of images 
reported during the positive condition. Regarding imagery duration, the GAD group 
reported briefer images than the control group and briefer images were also reported 
during worrying than during the positive topic (Hirsch et al., 2012). Further evidence for 
the verbal nature of worry was found in Behar et al. (2005) study. The intensity in which 
the induction of worry and trauma recall is associated with imaginal in comparison to 
verbal activity in both an unselected and a selected sample was investigated. Participants’ 
reports supported the idea that worry is predominantly a verbal thinking process, while 
trauma recall is an imaginal process. Behar et al. (2005) speculate that during worry 
activity threatening images are substituted by verbal content as a way of avoiding 
stronger somatic and emotional reactions (more associated to images) and, thus, 
maintaining worry through negative reinforcement. Complementing these findings, 
Hirsch et al. (2015) found that imagery, even negative, reduces later intrusions as 
compared with verbal perseveration. 
 In summary, worry is primarily a verbal process, however, to our knowledge, only 
two studies investigated linguistic features in individuals with GAD and worry (Geronimi 
& Woodruff-Borden, 2015; Molina et al., 1998; see details in the "Language: Worry" 
section, below). These studies suggest that worry and those with GAD are characterized 
by a unique pattern of language use (e.g., differences in verb tense and connectors). 
However, more research is needed in understanding the nature of the "internal dialog" 
characteristic of worry and GAD. Thus, psycholinguistic examinations could contribute 
to further elucidating the nature of worry. In particular, linguistics could be essential in 
better integrating the worry models, given that it provides direct and subtle cues about 
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cognitive and emotional processes. As a consequence, knowing the language that 
constitutes worry could provide additional theoretical foundation for treatment studies 
and interventions.  
Worry and GAD Conceptual Models: Physiology, Emotion, and Cognition 
 Three main different perspectives (i.e., physiological, emotional, and cognitive) 
have been adopted in trying to understand the worry phenomenon and GAD (e.g., Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002; Mennin et al., 2002; Thayer, et al., 1996), which are associated with 
specific worry theoretical models (see figure 1). First, from a physiological perspective, 
worry and GAD have been associated with a restricted range of autonomic responses 
(e.g., Thayer et al., 1996), which is mostly captured by the Avoidance Worry Model. 
Second, from an emotional perspective, worry has been characterized by difficulties in 
emotion regulation (e.g., Mennin et al., 2002), which are the foundation for the Emotion 
Dysregulation Model of Worry. Third, cognitively, worry and GAD have been associated 
with a maladaptive pattern of metacognitions (e.g., Thielsch, Andor, & Ehring, 2015; 
Wells, 1999) combined with difficulties in tolerating uncertainty (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 
2002), which are the key features of the IU and Metacognitive Worry Models.  
 As aforementioned, worry presents as an internal strategy for avoiding present 
moment experiences (Borkovec, 1994). Despite the fact that the Avoidance Worry Model 
is the one that most strongly supports worry as an avoidance strategy of present 
experiences, the other models are also suggestive of the avoidant nature of worry. Indeed, 
most recently, it has been proposed that none of the worry models alone is sufficient in 
capturing worry in its entirety, and integrated approaches, incorporating elements of each 
of the models, as well as their influences on each other, have been more successful in 
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explaining worry (Behar et al., 2009). Below, the main worry models are briefly 
described and literature supporting them is reviewed. 
The Avoidance Model. The avoidance function of worry is well established as 
the fundamental feature of the avoidance worry model; it is also a common feature across 
other conceptual models of worry (Behar et al., 2009). The avoidance model 
conceptualizes worry as an avoidant strategy that is reinforced in a variety of ways 
(Borkovec, 1994). A core feature of this model is the assumption that worry is primarily 
verbal in nature and that its verbal features are key in preventing the experience of 
somatic and emotional symptoms that are more closely associated to imagery (Behar et 
al., 2005; Borkovec & Inz, 1990). The first empirical attempt to establish worry as a way 
of preventing the processing of threatening material was conducted by Borkovec and Hu 
(1990). Speech anxious females engaged in neutral, relaxation or worrisome thinking just 
prior to imagining a phobic speech scene. Heart rate (HR) was recorded during the entire 
procedure and measurements of subjective fear and vividness of the scene were gathered 
following each trial. Results revealed that, although no differences in HR were found 
during the three types of thinking, worry caused the greatest subjective fear response to 
the images and produced the lowest HR responses in the subsequent threatening scene 
compared to the other two groups. These findings were later replicated (e.g., Peasley-
Miklus & Vrana, 2000).  
Taken together, these results suggest that worry may inhibit the processing of 
threatening information and, thus, maintain the cognitive and affective fear response 
patterns, despite repeated exposures (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006). Complementing the 
findings related to HR, limited autonomic responses have also characterized worry 
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periods as well as GAD participants. More specifically, Thayer et al. (1996) found that, 
relative to baseline and relaxation periods, worry was associated with heart related 
measures (e.g., shorter interbeat intervals) that reflect lower autonomic modulation. 
Similarly, GAD individuals, compared to controls also exhibited poorer autonomic 
modulation across all tasks (Thayer et al., 1996).  
Another way worry is negatively reinforced is by beliefs about worry or functions 
that are attributed to the worry process. Since the catastrophic outcomes expected by the 
worrier rarely happen, worry is more likely to reoccur in the future and to be seen as a 
strategy for preventing undesired outcomes from happening (Borkovec, 1994). Borkovec 
and Roemer (1995) investigated six perceived functions of worry by individuals with 
GAD in comparison to controls and nonworried anxious individuals. Interestingly 
“distraction from more emotional things” distinguished between the three groups, with 
individuals with GAD scoring higher, followed by nonworried anxious individuals, and 
controls scoring lower. The authors’ interpretation gives further support to the idea that 
worry serves an emotional avoidant function as well as the suppression of anxiety-related 
somatic symptoms (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). Borkovec (1994) has extensively argued 
about the avoidance function of worry. According to his view, since the future threat 
exists only in the minds of the individuals who worry, thought semantic activity is one of 
the few possibilities left as an attempt to prevent hypothetical negative events from 
happening.  
Despite the fact that clear individual differences exist when attributing reasons to 
worry, the five reasons most commonly mentioned clearly relate to avoidance of some 
sort of threat (Borkovec, 1994). Interestingly, the first two (i.e., actual and superficial 
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avoidance of catastrophe) are forms of delayed negative reinforcement of worry activity; 
the other three (i.e., avoidance of emotional content, coping preparation, and motivation) 
serve as a momentary source of worry reinforcement. Thus, regardless of what the real 
function of worry may be, it appears to chronic worriers as an “effective” negative 
reinforcing activity, both in the short and long terms. 
The Emotion Dysregulation Model. Emotion dysregulation has been proposed 
as one of the deficits found in individuals with GAD (Mennin et al., 2002). More 
specifically, it has been suggested that those with GAD have poor understanding of their 
emotional states, experience more intense emotions, show negative reactivity to 
emotional experience, and are not as equipped in regulating their emotions (Mennin et al., 
2002; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). These difficulties contribute 
to experiencing emotions as aversive, and thus, those with GAD engage in worry activity 
to avoid, control, and minimize emotional experiences (Mennin et al., 2002). Similar to 
the Emotion Dysregulation Model theory, the Contrast Avoidance Model of GAD 
suggests that those at risk for excessive worry and GAD fear emotional changes from 
positive or neutral emotions into negative states, using worry to maintain negative 
emotions and avoid shifts (e.g., Crouch, Lewis, Erickson, & Newman, 2017; Newman, 
Llera, Erickson, & Przeworski, 2014). 
 Empirical evidence for the role of emotion dysregulation in worry and GAD is 
provided by several studies (e.g., Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005; Salters-
Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006). For instance, Mennin et al. (2005) 
found that individuals with GAD endorsed more intense emotions, lower ability to 
understand emotions, higher negative reactivity in response to emotional experience, and 
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lower ability to remain calm after experiencing negative emotions in comparison to 
control individuals. Similarly, Salters-Pedneault et al. (2006) found that poor general 
emotion regulation was associated with self-reported levels of worry and analogue GAD. 
In addition, different constituents of emotion regulation such as emotional clarity, 
acceptance of emotions, and access to effective regulation strategies were negatively 
associated with worry and analogue GAD.  
Additional evidence for the role of emotions in GAD is provided by a study that 
also investigated worry inductions (McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007). In 
McLaughlin et al.'s (2007) study, participants with GAD (with and without comorbid 
dysphoria) were randomly assigned to worry, neutral, and relaxation inductions. After the 
induction, all participants watched a clip to elicit sadness. Participants with GAD (both 
with and without dysphoria) in the worry condition experienced higher levels of 
depressed affect compared to GAD participants in the other conditions and controls. 
Emotion dysregulation, on the other hand, was higher in those with GAD, but was not 
affected by the inductions. After viewing the clip, participants with GAD (in both groups) 
showed lower understanding, acceptance, and management of emotions compared to 
controls. However, acceptance and management difficulties were higher in those with 
GAD who also had dysphoria.  
  In contrast, other studies provide mixed results regarding the association between 
emotion dysregulation and both GAD and worry. For instance, in one study, those with 
GAD reported more intense emotional experiences; however, they did not show poor 
emotion differentiation and applied emotion regulation strategies more often than control 
individuals (Decker, Turk, Hess, & Murray, 2008). Analogously, contrary to their 
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expectations, Novick-Kline, Turk, Mennin, Hoyt, and Gallagher (2005), found that those 
with GAD scored higher than controls in emotional awareness. It is important to mention, 
however, that in this study the method used was not self-report, as in the other studies, 
but a rater-coded measure. 
 The specificity of emotion dysregulation to GAD and worry remains unclear, and 
studies comparing GAD to other pathologies also show mixed findings. Turk et al. (2005) 
compared features of emotion dysregulation in patients with GAD compared to those 
with social anxiety. While individuals with social anxiety expressed positive emotions to 
a lower degree, paid less attention to their emotions, and had more difficulties describing 
emotions compared to those with GAD and controls, GAD patients reported higher 
emotion intensity and more fear of experiencing depression compared to the other two 
groups. Furthermore, emotion measures successfully differentiated between the three 
groups. Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg (2007) investigated the 
specificity of emotional variables to GAD, major depression, and social anxiety. They 
found that emotional intensity and maladaptive management are particularly associated 
with GAD as compared with major depression and social anxiety. On the other hand, 
poor understanding and negative reactivity to emotions predicted major depression and 
social anxiety when overlap between disorders was considered, but this was not true for 
GAD.   
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Model. IU has been constantly linked to 
exaggerated worry and has received growing attention in the field (e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 
2002; Buhr & Dugas, 2006). IU consists of negative responses when facing uncertain and 
ambiguous situations (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). IU is a fundamental component of worry; it 
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plays a key role in its etiology and maintenance (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) and has been 
conceptualized as a central piece in theoretical models of worry and GAD (Dugas, 
Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). Further, IU has recently been proposed as a 
mediator of the relation between personality and worry (Yang, Wang, Chen, & Ding, 
2015).  
Early studies examining differences between high and low worriers suggested that 
high worriers display several features that differentiate them from low worriers. For 
instance, Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, and Borkovec (1990) conducted a study 
investigating the role of worry level in cognitive processing differences. Worriers were 
classified as those who reported 50% or greater daily worry and nonworriers as those 
below this level. Participants engaged in a categorization task. The groups did not show 
differences in their responses when the stimulus was easily perceived as a member or 
non-member of the category. However, as the stimulus ambiguity level increased in 
relation to the category, worriers displayed a higher difficulty in processing. These results 
suggest that in face of uncertainty or ambiguity, higher worriers show a higher difficulty 
in making decisions. Consistent with these findings, Tallis and Eysenck (1994) reviewed 
that several studies have shown that, when faced with categorical decisions, worriers 
need more evidence than non-worriers before they are able to make a decision. In 
addition, Russell and Davey (1993) found that worry was significantly correlated with 
evaluating ambiguous situations as threatening. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that when faced with ambiguous stimuli, high worriers may experience more difficulties 
since they tend to evaluate them in a negative way.  
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In an attempt to test a conceptual worry model, Dugas et al. (1998) found that IU, 
beliefs about worry, poor problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance discriminated 
between individuals with GAD and controls. Most importantly, IU was the variable that 
most contributed to the model. In the proposed model, the presence of IU functions as a 
fundamental cognitive piece in initiating questions (e.g., “what if”) even when a 
precipitating stimulus is not present (Dugas et al., 1998). Ladouceur et al. (1999) 
investigated the specificity of GAD. While sensitivity was found for four process 
variables (i.e., problem orientation, IU, cognitive avoidance, and beliefs about worry), 
only IU and problem orientation were variables specific to GAD. Complementary, IU 
was found to be specific to worry when investigating a nonclinical sample of individuals 
(Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). More specifically, IU was found to be highly 
correlated with worry, moderately correlated with obsessions and compulsions, and 
weakly correlated with panic sensations. In addition, worry was the strongest predictor of 
IU and IU was the strongest predictor of worry. These findings suggest that the relation 
between worry and IU is ubiquitous and can be found both in clinical and nonclinical 
populations.  
As a first attempt to investigate the directionality of the relationship between 
worry and IU, IU was experimentally manipulated (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 
2000). In this study, two groups engaged in a gambling game. One group was told that it 
was hard to win money for a foundation (increased intolerance) while the other was told 
that the foundation would get money regardless of the game outcome (decreased 
intolerance). Results revealed that participants who were exposed to increased intolerance 
presented higher levels of worry than those who were presented with decreased 
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intolerance. Although this study had poor ecological validity and further research is 
needed before causality can be assumed, it contributes to the understanding of the close 
relation between IU and worry. 
The Metacognitive Model. Another way to conceptualize pathological worry is 
by the role of metacognitions. Metacognition relates to ideas and evaluations about 
cognition regarding the capacity to monitor and control cognition (Flavell, 1979; as cited 
in Wells, 1999). The key piece of this model is that it distinguishes between two types of 
worry (Wells, 1994, 1995, 1999).  Type 1 worry is defined as worry about general events 
or worry about internal events that are noncognitive in nature; on the other hand, Type 2 
worry, or metaworry, is defined in metacognitive terms, or is the worry about the way in 
which individuals think (Wells, 1994, 1995, 1999).   
 Based on their experience with the worry processes, individuals with GAD 
elaborate their own beliefs about worry. Two types of belief are particularly important in 
this model: positive beliefs about worry, or beliefs that worrying has a protective and 
coping function, and negative beliefs about worry, or beliefs that worry is difficult to 
control and can cause threatening consequences (Wells, 1999, 2006). As patients with 
GAD encounter a threatening situation, positive beliefs about worry are elicited and the 
individual engages in worry as a coping strategy in order to further evaluate the situation 
(Type 1 worry).  
Positive beliefs about worrying are a frequently used strategy and do not 
necessarily indicate pathology (Wells, 2006). Nonetheless, as the individual engages in it, 
the worry process itself may become problematic and contribute to further negative 
evaluations (Wells, 1999). It is precisely the presence of these negative metacognitive 
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beliefs, and the related meta-worry that is key to the start and maintenance of GAD 
(Wells, 2006). At this point, worry itself may start to be overwhelming and distressing, 
contributing to negative beliefs about it, or negative metaworry (Type 2 worry). Anxiety 
then increases as a result of type 2 worry and as a consequence type 2 worry contributes 
to the view of worry as a threatening process, which the client is unable to deal with. 
Individuals with GAD respond to type 2 worry in ways that reinforce the negative beliefs 
and type 2 worry itself. For instance, as individuals with GAD try to control or eliminate 
the worry experience, they paradoxically experience more worry and higher inability to 
control it.  
 Empirical evidence supporting the metacognitive worry model is derived from 
different sources. First, studies provide support to the association of worry activity in 
clinical and non-clinical samples with positive beliefs about worry. For instance, Tallis, 
Davey and Capuzzo (1994) conducted a preliminary study on the phenomenology of 
worry in a non-clinical sample. They identified two factors associated with the perceived 
advantages of engaging in worry: motivation and preparatory or analytical thinking. 
These aspects are closely related to the positive beliefs about worrying. Borkovec and 
Roemer (1995) investigated positive beliefs about worry in relation to GAD, other 
anxious states, and control individuals. Participants with GAD rated distraction from 
more emotional thoughts higher than either the nonworried anxious or control subjects, 
and they rated superstition and problem-solving higher than the control group (Borkovec 
& Roemer, 1995).  
Further evidence for the role of positive beliefs about worry in relation to the 
pathological worry process comes from a study by Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997). 
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In their study, positive beliefs about worry were a reliable factor in predicting trait 
anxiety and general worry proneness. Pathological worry was also associated with 
negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger, lack of cognitive confidence, and 
trait anxiety. However, it is important to mention that positive beliefs contributed to 
worry independently of negative beliefs. According to the authors, the study results are 
consistent with the idea that some individuals may be more likely to worry because of the 
positive beliefs they endorse about worrying.  
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) were also interested in testing whether 
beliefs about worry were specific to individuals with GAD and compared metacognitive 
subscales of individuals with GAD to those of individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder, a disorder associated with high worry levels, and with patients with other 
emotional disorders. According to the findings, individuals with GAD presented similar 
levels of positive beliefs in relation to individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
and other emotional disorders, suggesting that although associated with high worry 
levels, positive beliefs about worry are not specific to patients with GAD. Overall, these 
findings suggest that individuals who worry, either at a clinical and non-clinical level, 
present with positive beliefs about worrying. These findings are consistent with the 
metacognitive model which proposes that beliefs about the advantages of worrying can 
be conceptualized as a coping mechanism (Wells, 2006).  As expected, positive beliefs 
about worrying are not specific to GAD and are present in non-clinical populations (e.g., 
Tallis et al., 1994) and other disorders (e.g., Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). In 
addition, they were found not to distinguish between individuals with GAD, high 
worriers without GAD, and control individuals (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004), nor between 
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those with GAD compared to those with panic disorder, social phobia, and depression 
(Wells & Carter, 2001). According to Wells’ (2006) metacognitive model, negative 
beliefs about worry is the element that distinguishes between pathological and non-
pathological worry. 
 The second main source of evidence for the metacognitive model is based on 
studies that investigated negative metacognitions and meta-worry in relation to worry 
(Davis & Valentiner, 2000; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004; Thielsch et al., 2015; Wells & 
Carter, 1999; Wells & Carter, 2001; Wells, 2005).  Wells and Carter (1999) provided 
preliminary evidence of the role of meta-worry in predicting worry and worry-related 
problems. In a series of regressions, they found that meta-worry significantly predicted 
both pathological worry and worry-related problems even when controlling for type 1 
worries, trait anxiety, and the controllability of worrying. As expected, type 1 worry did 
not predict worry and worry-related problems when controlling for the other variables 
analyzed. With the aim of replicating laboratory findings to a more ecologically valid 
context, Thielsch et al. (2015) found that negative metacognitive beliefs predicted 
everyday worry even when controlling for trait worry and predicted unique variance in 
worry when intolerance of uncertainty was also included in a model predicting worry. 
Research has also been conducted to compare negative beliefs in those with GAD 
to controls and other diagnostic groups. Those with GAD scored higher on negative 
beliefs about worry and meta-worry than those with social phobia and non-patients 
(Wells & Carter, 2001). Furthermore, these results remained significant after controlling 
for type 1 worry. However, individuals with GAD did not differ from those with panic 
disorder when type 1 worry was controlled for. Evidence also exists for similar levels of 
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negative beliefs about worry between those with GAD and obsessive-compulsive patients 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). In Cartwright-Hatton and Wells’s (1997) study, 
GAD patients scored similarly to those with obsessive-compulsive disorder in negative 
beliefs and both scored higher than individuals with emotional disorders and control 
individuals. Additional evidence for differences in worry and meta-worry, including 
negative beliefs about worry, between individuals with GAD and other groups (i.e., 
nonanxious, non-GAD high worriers, somatic anxiety, and non-worried anxious) is 
shown in studies by Davis and Valentiner (2000), Ruscio and Borkovec (2004), and 
Wells (2005). Taken together, these findings suggest that negative metacognitions and 
meta-worry are consistently related with higher levels of worry and pathological worry. 
However, these beliefs may not be specific to GAD, since they do not distinguish 
between those with GAD and those with OCD and panic disorder (Cartwright-Hatton & 
Wells, 1997; Wells, 2005; Wells & Carter, 2001). 
Mindfulness 
As detailed above, mindfulness is defined as self-regulated awareness toward the 
present moment, combined with an attitude of orientation to experience, which includes 
curiosity and acceptance of one’s experiences (Bishop et al., 2004). Worry, on the other 
hand, is future orientated, serves an avoidance strategy (Borkovec, 1994), and is 
associated with intolerance of uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). In comparison to 
worry, mindfulness has been associated with different and more adaptive physiology 
(Vlemincx et al.,, 2013), emotions (Feldman et al., 2007) and cognitive activity 
(Jankowski & Holas, 2014; see figure 1). When approaching experiences in a mindful 
fashion, one is better able to experience the present moment, given that physiological, 
19 
 
   
 
emotional and cognitive aspects are accepted without judgment (Kabat-Zinn, 2013). 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that low levels of mindfulness are associated with 
excessive or pathological worry (e.g., Ruiz, 2014). Conversely, understanding 
mindfulness and what constitutes this state can inform us about mental and emotional 
processes that occur when worry is at its lowest levels, and thus, inform us about what the 
necessary elements and strategies would be in order to decrease worry. This is consistent 
with findings that mindfulness interventions are effective in treating worry (e.g., Craigie 
et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). In this section, mindfulness is first defined, from a 
Buddhist and a clinical perspective, and its association with healthy psychological states 
is briefly presented. Next, aspects pertaining to the mindfulness physiology, emotion, and 
cognitions are briefly presented; special attention is given to features that differ from 
worrisome states. Then mindfulness interventions for worry are presented followed by a 
discussion about possible mechanisms of change. 
The concept of mindfulness originated in Buddhist practices, but in recent years, 
has been increasingly adopted in Western healthcare settings. According to the Buddhist 
view, suffering is a product of not being able to appropriately understand reality and it 
can be overcome by fully contemplating the world as it is (Thera, 1992). The Buddhist 
practice of mindfulness is defined as a way of quietly focusing on our internal balance: to 
note and accept compassionately our own thoughts and emotions at any given point, and 
to try not to engage in this thinking and emotional flow, having a nonjudgmental 
awareness of one’s own thoughts and emotions (Coffman, 2013). As previously 
mentioned, in Western clinical settings, mindfulness is generally defined by two main 
features (Chambers, et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). First, mindfulness 
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encompasses the process of focusing attention and being aware of internal and external 
aspects of the present moment. Second, this present-moment experience is faced in a non-
judgmental way; that is, in a mindful state, experiences are simply acknowledged and 
examined without further elaborations or reactions. 
 Generally, mindfulness practice, such as breathing and attention meditation 
exercises, has been associated with better psychological states. In fact, mindfulness 
training has resulted in lower levels of depression, rumination, negative affect, 
improvements in some executive function domains (e.g., working memory and sustained 
attention; Chambers et al., 2008), lower levels of anxiety (e.g., Baer, 2003; Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010), and worry (Craigie et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). 
Mindfulness and Physiology 
Studies investigating mindfulness and physiology suggest that the physiological 
features associated with mindfulness are distinct from those associated with worry, and 
that they show opposite patterns of responding (Vlemincx et al., 2013). For instance, 
Vlemincx et al. (2013) compared respiratory variability during worry and mindfulness. 
Participants engaged in both a worry and a mindfulness-induced period. Several markers 
of respiratory variability distinguished between worry and mindfulness, such that worry 
was characterized by reduced breathing stability and decreased variability, while 
mindfulness was associated with higher variability in respiratory rate and higher 
breathing flexibility. There were several significant limitations of this study, including a 
predominance of females, a nonanxious sample, and the utilization of only one session of 
induced worry and mindfulness. Nevertheless, it provides initial evidence that 
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physiological markers of worry are distinct from those of mindfulness and that 
mindfulness appears to be associated with higher physiological flexibility.  
In a study using performance on a breathing exercise to measure mindfulness, 
Burg, Wolf, and Michalak (2012) investigated the degree to which heart rate variability 
and mindfulness are associated. As expected, mindfulness and heart rate variability were 
positively correlated, suggesting higher autonomic regulation in those high in this trait. 
Complementing these findings, May et al. (2016) showed that eliciting mindfulness in a 
laboratory through a meditation-like format positively affected cardiovascular 
modulation. 
Mindfulness and Emotion Regulation  
 Similar to findings regarding physiology, compared to worrisome states (Mennin 
et al., 2002), mindfulness has been associated with better emotional strategies (Bockman, 
Ciarrochi, Parker, & Kashdan, 2017; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010; Feldman et 
al., 2007). Mindfulness represents the ability to acknowledge emotions as momentary 
“waves” and experience them entirely with no urge to react to them (Kabat-Zinn, 2013). 
Consistent with this idea, studies have linked mindfulness traits or tendencies and 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Coffey et al., 2010; Feldman et al., 2007). 
For instance, Feldman et al. (2007) found that mindfulness and emotion regulation 
strategies were highly associated. In addition, through their findings, they argued that a 
mindfulness state goes beyond management of emotions, but it encompasses flexibility, 
emotional awareness, and the ability to remain calm when emotionally upset. In line with 
Feldman et al. (2007) findings, through a path analysis, Coffey et al. (2010) found that 
mindfulness (conceptualized as a two-factor construct incorporating present-centered 
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attention and acceptance of experience) fostered understanding or clarity about 
experience, which in turn improved the ability to handle negative emotions. Using a diary 
methodology, Bockman et al.'s (2017) study showed that mindfulness was associated 
with lower negative and higher positive affect and that when mindfulness, suppression, 
and reappraisal were tested in the same model, mindfulness predicted unique variance in 
emotional well-being.  
Mindfulness and Cognitions 
 Although some aspects of mindfulness and worry suggest that they may differ 
cognitively (e.g., cognitive flexibility, attention; Fox, Dutton, Yates, Georgiou, & 
Mouchlianitis, 2015; Kerr, Sacchet, Lazar, Moore, & Jones, 2013; Ruiz, 2014), very little 
is known about how mindfulness and worry differ in relation to cognitive features of the 
worry models (i.e., verbal and imaginal activity; IU), with the exception of 
metacognitions, which have started to be explored in the mindfulness context. 
 Jankowski and Holas (2014) recently proposed a mindfulness metacognitive 
model, which states that, given its very definition, mindfulness can be conceptualized 
from a metacognitive perspective. That is, it incorporates two levels of cognition: the 
basic stage which encompasses elements of immediate experience (e.g., perceptions) and 
a more advanced stage which consists of a global cognitive awareness incorporating 
elements of the basic stage. According to the proposed model, this higher metacognitive 
level also includes several other levels of cognition and metacognition. Mindfulness itself 
represents the highest metacognitive level, and between this level and the most basic one, 
several others could exist. For instance, judging oneself for something may be a 
momentary meta-cognitive level. Interestingly, the higher level of metacognition 
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proposed by Jankowski and Holas (2014), which incorporates several other levels of 
cognition, contrasts with the worry metacognitive model (Wells, 1999) in which "worry 
about worry" becomes the overarching or dominant metacognition.  
Although it offers a new and sound way of approaching mindfulness, the 
metacognitive model proposed by Jankowski and Holas (2014) requires further empirical 
validation. For instance, a measure for assessing metacognitions in a mindfulness context 
has still to be developed. Nonetheless, the model presents an innovative way of 
conceptualizing mindfulness metacognitively. Thus, in addition to the emotional and 
physiological aspects that characterize worry and mindfulness as distinct in nature, 
metacognitions could also be one important feature in making this distinction. 
Physiologically and emotionally, worry is associated with a restricted or rigid style in 
comparison to mindfulness (Bockman, 2017; Feldman et al., 2007; May et al., 2016; 
Mennin et al., 2002; Thayer et al., 1996; Vlemincx et al., 2013). Similarly, the 
metacognitions characteristic of these states would be manifested by a restricted range of 
metacognitions in worry compared to a broader and more flexible range of 
metacognitions in mindfulness (Wells, 2006; Jankowski & Holas, 2014). However, again, 
the mindfulness metacognitive model still needs further empirical validation.  
 Linguistic investigations could be a way of better understanding metacognitive 
manifestations in mindfulness, as well as other aspects that contrast to worry models, 
such as verbal and imaginal activity, as well as the IU. These investigations could provide 
foundation for mindfulness interventions for worry, especially regarding cognitive 
mechanisms of change. 
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Mindfulness Treatments for Worry and GAD 
Mindfulness interventions for worry have been successful in clinical patients as 
well as in the general population (see Querstret & Cropley, 2013 for a systematic review), 
and although most studies used self-report measures, preliminary evidence also suggests 
that these interventions may ameliorate physiological markers (see Delgado et al., 2010 
study, above).  
The Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program is an 8-week 
educational intervention for medical patients consisting of training in mindfulness 
meditation and its use in daily life (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-
Zinn, 1995). Patients are trained in both formal (e.g., sitting meditation, body scan) and 
informal (e.g., mindfulness eating, stress reactivity) mindfulness practices in which they 
are required to engage daily during the program. In Kabat-Zinn et al.'s (1992) study, the 
MBSR program was used to treat patients with GAD and panic disorder. Assessments 
(self-report and therapists’ evaluations) were obtained prior, during the program, at 3-
month follow-up, and at a 3-year follow-up period (Miller et al., 1995). Patients showed 
significant declines in anxiety and depressive symptoms during the course of treatment; 
these declines were maintained at both the 3-month and 3-year follow-ups. Also, no 
significant outcome differences were found between the patients with GAD and panic 
disorder. Pre and post-treatment scores were compared with those of patients initially 
screened to participate, but who did not take part in the study. No differences were found 
between the patients enrolled in the program that participated and did not participate in 
the study; this suggests that no bias effect was suffered by those participating and that the 
improvements obtained by those in the program could generalize to most of those in the 
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MBSR who suffered from similar anxiety problems. In addition, this same pattern was 
maintained at the three year follow-up (Miller et al., 1995).  The comparison between 
those who took part in the study and those who were in the program but did not 
participate, as well as conducting a three year follow up (Miller et al., 1995), can be seen 
as strengths of this study. In addition, at the three year follow-up, the majority of the 
participants also reported still using formal and informal meditation practices in their 
everyday lives.  
Lee et al. (2007) studied treatment effects on a similar sample (i.e., GAD and 
panic who were currently taking medication). However, they did not use all aspects of the 
MBSR, but used a Korean stress-management program which had some features in 
common with it, such as meditation. Half of the subjects participated in this program, and 
the other half participated in an education program. The meditation program showed 
significant improvements in anxiety compared to the education group. Changes in 
depression were mixed, since they varied according to the measure used. Furthermore, 
those in the meditation group showed more improvement in hostility scores.  
 Similar to the MBSR, the Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) 
program involves 8-week 2-hour group sessions (Craigie et al., 2008; Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2012). In addition to mindfulness elements, the MBCT also involves CBT 
elements such as psychoeducation. Evans et al. (2008) investigated the effectiveness of 
an open trial 8-week group receiving MBCT. Results revealed a significant decrease in 
worry, depression, anxiety, and tension after the therapy program. Patients with clinically 
significant symptoms of anxiety, worry, and depression had their scores reduced to non-
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clinical levels after the program. There was also a decrease in mindful awareness; 
however this finding failed to reach significance.  
Craigie et al.’s (2008) study more extensively evaluated improvements in GAD 
patients following a group MBCT program. Large treatment effects were found for 
measures of worry, depression, stress, and fear of relaxation. Improvements were small 
only for anxiety. At the 6-week follow up, all measures showed significant improvements 
relative to pre-treatment and similar results were found at the 3-month follow-up, with 
the exception of anxiety that failed to reach significance. Effect sizes had similar ranges 
to those observed at post treatment. Post-treatment scores and follow-up points were 
compared as well. The only significant finding for this analysis was that at the 6-week 
follow-up, there was an improvement in worry scores. Still regarding worry scores, the 
majority of patients experienced a reliable improvement at post-treatment; however, only 
a low percentage of them had recovered from this condition. Improvements on worry and 
depression measures were similar and slightly better than those found in Evans et al.’s 
(2008) study. The authors mention, however, that although worry effect sizes were large, 
they were still lower than those observed in multi-component CBT treatments. A number 
of factors such as clinical complexity and co-morbidity may account for these results. 
Patients reported improvements in quality of life, suggesting that MBCT is associated 
with improvements beyond disorder specific symptoms.  
Kim et al. (2009) investigated the effectiveness of a MBCT intervention in 
patients with GAD or panic disorder currently taking medication. Subjects were assigned 
to either MBCT or an anxiety disorder education program. The MBCT group had greater 
decreases in anxiety, obsessive-compulsive, and depression scales compared to the 
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education group. In addition, at post-treatment, significantly more patients in the MBCT 
group met criteria for remission. No differences between groups were found for scales of 
somatization, interpersonal sensitivity, paranoid ideation, psychoticism, and global 
sensitivity index. However, this finding is not surprising, given that these scales should in 
fact not be as closely related to changes in anxiety levels as anxious and depressive 
scales.  
 Yet a different mindfulness-based intervention used in patients with GAD is the 
Acceptance-Based Behavior Therapy (ABBT). Similar to MBCT, ABBT combines 
elements of both mindfulness and CBT interventions. The avoidance theory of worry, the 
difficulties with emotions, and behavioral avoidance found in high worriers provide 
theoretical and empirical support for using ABBT for treating worry and GAD (Roemer 
& Orsillo, 2002, 2007). Roemer and Orsillo (2002, 2007) propose an ABBT program 
based on promoting present-moment awareness, developing acceptance rather than 
judgment of internal experiences, and encouraging action in areas that the individual 
finds meaningful. In an open trial of ABBT, GAD clients received individual therapy and 
were assessed pre-post, and three months after treatment ended (Roemer & Orsillo, 
2007). Results revealed that large and lasting effects were found for GAD severity, 
worry, anxiety, depressive symptoms, and quality of life. The proportion of clients 
classified as responders at posttreatment was higher than in previous trials, although the 
proportion classified as high end-state functioning was equivalent. However, these 
proportions decreased at the 3-month follow-up, making them either comparable to or 
slightly lower than previous trials.  
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 Roemer, Orsillo, and Salters-Pedneault (2008) expanded Roemer and Orsillo’s 
(2007) study. Clients were randomly assigned to immediate or delayed treatment. 
Treatment had a large effect on GAD-specific outcomes (i.e., GAD severity, worry, and 
stress) and depressive symptoms. Marginally significant findings with medium effect 
sizes were found for anxious arousal symptoms, quality of life, and additional diagnoses. 
In addition, the treatment changes were clinically significant and lasting. At post-
treatment, a high percentage of the sample met criteria for responder and high end-state 
functioning, and these results were maintained at the 9-month follow-up, thus providing 
better outcomes as compared to Roemer and Orsillo’s (2007) study.  
 Although key in explicating the important role of mindfulness in treating worry 
and GAD, the aforementioned studies have several limitations; for instance, some of 
them do not have a worry-specific measure (e.g., Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992, 2009; Lee et 
al., 2007), do not have a control or comparison group (e.g., Craigie et al., 2008; Evans et 
al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Lee et al., 2007), had patients enrolled in the study 
who were taking medications, making it hard to delineate the specific contribution of the 
treatment (e.g., Kim et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2007), and had a small sample size (e.g., 
Evans et al., 2008).  
Possible Mechanisms of Change Involved in Mindfulness Treatments for Worry 
 As mentioned above, the worry cycle is maintained through the inability to accept 
present experience in pathological worry, and consequently the use of maladaptive 
strategies (physiological, emotional, and cognitive; Bockman, 2017; Buhr & Dugas, 
2002; Feldman et al., 2007; Mennin et al., 2002; Thayer et al., 1996). Contrarily, in a 
mindful state, the acceptance of whatever is presented at a given moment (Kabat-Zinn, 
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2013), even painful situations and experiences, is responsible for the maintenance of a 
healthier state and for more adaptive physiological, emotional, and cognitive experiences. 
Again, not surprisingly, mindfulness treatments have been effective in treating worry 
(Craigie et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992).   
 Given this contrasting approach to experience in mindfulness and worrisome 
states, combined with evidence of the effectiveness of mindfulness in treating worry 
(Craigie et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992), it appears that developing a more mindful 
approach to reality, or engaging in the emotional, physiological, and cognitive patterns 
that constitute mindful states, is important in decreasing worry symptoms. Indeed, 
mindfulness itself has been proposed as a mechanism of change in mindfulness 
interventions for worry (Roemer et al., 2008). Mindfulness is a complex, multi-
component construct, and understanding how each of its components (i.e., physiological, 
emotional, cognitive) change may better inform us about the changing trajectories 
involved in worry interventions based on this approach. Literature on the mechanisms of 
change involved in mindfulness interventions for worry, or to elements of worry models, 
is reviewed below.  
 Changing physiology. In the Delgado et al. (2010) study, psychological and 
physiological outcomes were analyzed after a mindfulness-based intervention for high 
worriers. A group of female university students participated in a mindfulness intervention 
or a progressive muscle relaxation plus self-instruction to postpone worrying 
intervention. The two groups did not differ in clinical and daily self-report measures. 
However, those participating in the mindfulness intervention reported better emotional 
comprehension and displayed a reduced breathing pattern and higher vagal reactivity, 
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thus showing better somatic and autonomic regulation. Combined, these results suggest 
that mindfulness contributes to better emotional and physiological strategies as opposed 
to those associated with pathological worry.  
 Tang et al. (2009) investigated physiological outcomes during and following an 
integrative body-mind training based on meditation and mindfulness principles as 
compared with a relaxation group. The integrative group displayed better physiological 
markers as measured by heart rate, rate and amplitude of respiration, and skin 
conductance as compared to the control group, during and following training. That is, 
comparisons of these physiological markers between groups suggest that the autonomic 
nervous system was more effective in the integration group then in the control group, 
thus providing evidence that mindfulness-based interventions are superior to relaxation in 
improving physiological markers found to be associated with worry in previous studies 
(e.g., Thayer et al., 1996). Further, a recent study provides evidence of the effectiveness 
of mindfulness treatments for changing biomarkers in those with GAD (Hoge et al., 
2018). Hoge et al. (2018) found that, in comparison to those in an attention control class, 
MBSR participants had greater decrease in adrenocorticotropic hormone and in 
inflammatory cytokines concentrations. 
 Changing emotions. Davidson (2010) proposed that mindfulness interventions 
may change one's connection to one's own emotions such that they are conceptualized as 
transient states as opposed to essential constituents of the self. The development of this 
ability may be particularly important in treating worry, given the difficulties in managing 
emotions found in high worriers (Mennin et al., 2002). Although several studies suggest 
emotion pattern modification as mechanisms of change in mindfulness interventions 
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(e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006; Sass, Berenbaum, & Abrams, 2013), only one study to date 
investigated changes in emotion in an intervention for high worriers (Delgado et al., 
2010). In this study, compared to the control group, those participating in the mindfulness 
intervention showed higher emotional comprehension, defined as better understanding 
and ability to distinguish between feelings (see details about this study above). 
 Sass et al. (2013) used a brief, five session mindfulness training, to test discomfort 
with emotions as a moderator of mindfulness interventions. Discomfort with emotions, or 
low emotional acceptance, was found to moderate reductions in distress. That is, those 
low in discomfort with emotion displayed more reduction in distress as a result of the 
mindfulness intervention. Evidence of the important role of emotions in mindfulness 
interventions also comes from a study using a neurological approach to measure 
emotions. Farb et al. (2010) used functional MRI to investigate neurological differences 
in response to a sadness induction (i.e., film clips) in participants completing eight weeks 
of mindfulness training as compared to waiting list controls. Although reports of sadness 
were not significantly different between the groups, those participating in the mindfulness 
training displayed a different neural response, such that there was greater right-lateralized 
activity, corresponding to visceral and somatosensory areas related to body sensation; the 
intensity of this neural activity following sadness induction was also associated with 
lower depression ratings.   
 Additional support to the role of emotions in mindfulness interventions also 
comes from laboratory settings (Arch & Craske, 2006; Erisman & Roemer, 2010). 
Participants in the Erisman and Roemer (2010) study watched distressing, positive and 
emotionally ambiguous film clips right after having watched analogous film clips and 
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receiving either mindfulness or neutral education (control condition). There were no 
differences in emotion regulation and response for the two conditions after the distressing 
film clip. However, participants in the mindfulness intervention condition showed higher 
levels of positive affect after the positive film as well as better emotion regulation and 
less negative affect after the emotionally ambiguous clip.  
Similarly, in Arch and Craske's (2006) study, a brief mindfulness intervention 
took place in the laboratory in the form of a breathing induction. Arch and Craske (2006) 
were interested in the emotion regulation mechanisms of mindfulness. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the mindfulness induction, unfocused attention, or worrying. Each 
group viewed a group of positive, neutral, and negative slides prior and after the 
inductions. While the mindfulness group did not show differential responses to the slides 
shown prior and after the induction, those in the other two conditions responded more 
negatively to the neutral slides presented after the inductions as compared to those 
presented before it. Compared to the worry group, the mindfulness group also had lower 
negative affect scores and emotional unpredictability following the post-induction 
images; compared to the unfocused attention group the mindfulness group showed higher 
disposition to watch negative images. The responses displayed by the mindfulness group 
show more adaptive responses to negative stimuli and better emotion regulation 
strategies.  
 Changing cognitions. To date, no studies have directly explored cognitive 
elements derived from worry models as potential mechanisms of change in mindfulness 
interventions for worry; however, results from two related studies suggest that 
metacognitions could be an important aspect of worry or other psychopathology 
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interventions. In this section we first discuss a study that used a metacognitive 
intervention for treating worry (Delgado-Pastor et al., 2015), then, we present a study that 
found metacognitive awareness to be a mechanism of change in depression interventions 
(Teasdale et al., 2002). 
 Delgado-Pastor et al. (2015) tested effects of two metacognitive constituents of 
mindfulness: metacognition and metainteroception (awareness of interoceptive 
sensations) in high worriers. Participants were randomly assigned to three groups: 
metacognition intervention, metainteroception intervention, and non-intervention. The 
metainteroception intervention consisted of exercises aimed at paying attention and 
accepting bodily and emotional states; the metacognition intervention was similar to the 
metainteroception one, but also incorporated awareness of one's thoughts. Despite this 
study’s limitations which included a female-only sample, small sample size, and short 
intervention, both clinical groups showed improvements in clinical symptoms and 
mindfulness. However, the metainteroceptive group was superior in that it also showed 
improvements in physiological measures of autonomic regulation. It could be argued that 
metainteroception is also an element of metacognition, given the fact that it refers to 
internal awareness (Jankowski & Holas, 2014). Overall, results from this study suggest 
that interventions targeting metacognitions are effective in treating worry. 
 Teasdale et al. (2002) investigated the role of metacognitive awareness, a concept 
closely related to metacognitions, in prevention of relapse in depressive patients exposed 
to either Cognitive Therapy or MBCT. Results showed that depressive metacognitions 
were more accessible in controls than in depressed patients and that the degree to which 
metacognitions were accessible predicted depression relapse. Both cognitive therapy and 
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MBCT reduced relapse by increasing accessibility of metacognitions. Thus, results from 
this study suggest that higher levels of metacognition are associated with healthier states.  
 Although this research is still very limited, aspects associated with adaptive 
physiology and emotions, presented above, have been proposed as potential mechanisms 
of change in mindfulness treatments for worry or for changing deficits related with worry 
(e.g., poor autonomic regulation, deficits in emotion regulation). Changes in cognitive 
activity could be another possible mechanism of change in mindfulness treatments for 
worry, however, compared with physiological and emotional features, little is known 
about what distinguishes worry and mindfulness cognitively. Establishing these 
differences will be essential in providing foundation for future studies assessing cognitive 
mechanisms of change. Linguistics presents as the appropriate method for this aim, given 
the direct access it provides to cognitions. Thus, through the use of linguistics we could 
have access to cognitive patterns or the internal dialog characteristic of worry and 
mindfulness states.  
 Below, psycholinguistic studies in psychopathology are discussed, particularly 
those investigating worry and GAD, as well as preliminary evidence involving the 
language of mindfulness.  
Psycholinguistics 
Given the aforementioned verbal nature of worry (e.g., Borkovec & Inz, 1990; 
Freeston et al., 1996), investigating the language associated with this mental activity and 
GAD is warranted in order to better understand this disorder and the structure of worry, 
which is closely associated with it. This investigation could be effectively accomplished 
through the use of psycholinguistics, given that psychological states can be assessed by 
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the language one uses (e.g., Rude et al., 2004; Stirman & Pennebaker 2001). 
Psycholinguistics is the intersection area between psychology and linguistics (Field, 
2005). It concerns the study of several linguistic aspects (i.e., semantics, grammar, 
phonology) as they relate to psychological aspects such as brain structure, behavior, 
cognitions, and most recently, psychopathology. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that a specific linguistic pattern is associated with 
worry and GAD (Geronimi & Woodruff-Borden, 2015; Molina et al., 1998). The 
exploration of psycholinguistic patterns also presents as an important alternative for 
addressing the limitations of extant research on worry. For instance, compared to the use 
of questionnaires, psycholinguistics presents more naturalistic ways of assessing worry 
features; psycholinguistics could also be helpful in establishing the key features 
associated with each of the worry models, given the immediate access it provides to 
psychological states, an area needing further exploration (Behar et al., 2009). 
Likewise, psycholinguistics could be essential in the investigation of healthier 
psychological states, such as mindfulness. Furthermore, given the contrasting nature of 
worry and mindfulness, the investigation of linguistic features or "internal dialog" 
associated with mindfulness could be helpful in distinguishing and delineating cognitive 
patterns associated with less adaptive thought processes, such as worry. Using such 
methods for studying mindfulness could also be particularly powerful in understanding 
this construct, given previously raised difficulties in operationally defining this complex 
concept (Grossman, 2008). Indeed, initial evidence suggests that mindful states may also 
relate to specific linguistic patterns (e.g., Collins et al., 2009; Moore & Brody, 2009).  
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Most importantly, given the effectiveness of mindfulness interventions for worry 
(e.g., Craigie et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992), better defining both constructs - worry 
and mindfulness - linguistically may tell us about the changes that need to occur 
cognitively for one to transition between a worrisome to a mindfulness state. That is, it 
could give us insight into the cognitive mechanisms of change involved in mindfulness 
interventions for worry. In particular, language as a method of assessing cognitions and 
emotions gives access to features that are not reachable through the use of self-report 
methods, which are frequently used in psychopathology investigations. This section 
briefly delineates the few findings related to the language of worry and mindfulness. 
Language: Worry 
Geronimi and Woodruff-Borden (2015) investigated linguistic features of 
individuals with GAD compared to nonanxious persons. The study examined parental 
language in a free play interaction designed to mimic a simple, naturalistic, daily 
situation. More specifically, based on the avoidance and intolerance of uncertainty 
theoretical models of worry, linguistic elements of parental speech were hypothesized to 
predict parental diagnostic status. As expected, elements of the avoidance worry model 
(i.e., present tense, future tense, and prepositions) and the intolerance of uncertainty 
model (i.e., number of questions) correctly classified those with GAD versus those who 
did not meet criteria for an anxiety disorder; that is, a considerable amount of the 
variance in diagnostic status was explained uniquely by language use. The presence of 
specific linguistic patterns in the speech and writing of individuals with depression or an 
anxiety disorder suggest that these individuals may have a particular way to turn their 
attention and process specific aspects of their environment, which may be driven by 
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rooted biases associated with their conditions (e.g., Geronimi & Woodruff-Borden, 2015; 
Hofmann, Moore, Gutner, & Weeks, 2012; Rude et al., 2004).  
Using a think-aloud procedure, Molina et al. (1998) evaluated the content and 
pattern of worrisome process, with the aim of capturing individual’s variations in “stream 
of thought”. Participants were characterized as meeting criteria for GAD by 
questionnaire, dysphoria, or controls. Participants were first instructed to simply think-
aloud (neutral task) and then to worry aloud (worry task). After the worry task, they were 
asked what their worry was primarily composed by: thoughts, images, or both. Think-
aloud and worry aloud contents were transcribed and coded for several features (e.g., 
temporal orientation, affect statements) and word search was conducted for some 
categories (e.g., cognitive distortions and somatic anxiety). In terms of temporal 
orientation, there was a significant decrease in present-oriented statements from neutral to 
worry periods and increases for future-oriented and past-oriented statements, although 
these did not reach significance. For affect statements, the proportion of high positive 
affect and low negative affect statements decreased from neutral to worry periods, while 
high negative statements increased. Regarding references to the environment (i.e., 
references to the laboratory), there was a decrease from neutral to worry periods and the 
same decrease was present for degree of shifting (i.e., how much participants shifted from 
one topic to another). In regards to adjectives, combining neutral and worry periods, 
participants with GAD used a higher frequency of anxiety-related words and dysphoric 
participants used a higher frequency of the word “worry.” Not surprisingly, the word 
“worry” was used at a higher frequency during worry compared to the neutral periods. 
There was a tendency for an increase in negative mood adjectives from neutral to worry 
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periods in dysphoric participants. Considering cognitive distortions (e.g., should, never, 
horrible), overall there was a higher frequency of “have to/should” words. There was a 
higher frequency of cognitive distortions during worry compared to the neutral period. 
Analogously, participants with GAD showed the highest occurrence of cognitive 
distortions followed by dysphoric and control participants. There was a lower frequency 
of “always/never” words among dysphoric participants compared to the other groups, and 
participants with GAD showed a higher frequency of “awful/terrible/horrible/what if" 
and “have to/should”. Finally, there was a tendency for participants with GAD and 
dysphoric participants to report a predominance of thoughts during worry as opposed to 
controls who reported predominantly a mixture of thoughts and images.  
Interestingly, Molina et al. (1998) found that present statements were higher 
during neutral periods as compared to worry, and that future statements were higher 
during worry. Using a different method, Geronimi and Woodruff-Borden (2015) found 
that GAD was associated with more future and less present tense use. Combined, these 
findings suggest that a temporal bias may be characteristic of both those with GAD and 
worry activity. Further, in the only study to date examining linguistic changes in those 
with GAD during psychotherapy (i.e., Therapist-Assisted Internet-Delivered CBT), 
Dirkse, Hadjstavropoulos, Hesser, and Barak (2015) found that past tense words 
increased during treatment. Dirkse and colleagues (2015) also found that the use of 
negative emotion, anxiety, causation, and insight words were reduced as treatment 
progressed and that negative emotion words covaried with symptom ratings.  
Overall, studies looking at language features in psychopathology have contributed 
to a better understanding of cognitions and emotions in specific groups. However, most 
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studies were conducted in the laboratory, thus limiting the ecological validity of the 
findings. More studies on linguistics of psychopathology are needed using more 
naturalistic methods in order to examine the generalizability of these findings to daily 
experiences. In addition, some studies focused on written language (e.g., Rude et al., 
2004) while others focused on spoken language (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2012); more studies 
are needed using these different communication forms in order to determine the solidity 
of the findings.  
Language: Mindfulness 
 The language associated with mindfulness has only been investigated in two 
studies related to treatment of substance abuse (Collins et al., 2009) and self disclosure 
narratives about recollections of traumatic events or daily events (Moore & Brody, 2009); 
however these preliminary findings suggest that there may be a specific linguistic pattern 
associated with mindful states. 
 In the Collins et al. (2009) study, linguistic analyses were conducted in 
participants' responses to open-ended questions related to their impressions of 
mindfulness practice and the substance use mindfulness-based relapse prevention 
program. Two word categories of mindfulness language were created. As hypothesized, 
mindfulness language was correlated with several other linguistic variables of interest. 
Mindfulness language negatively correlated with impersonal pronouns, past tense, and 
anger, and positively correlated with words related to affect, body and insight. In 
addition, the association between mindfulness language and the mindfulness-based 
relapse prevention program was higher than the association between mindfulness 
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language and another treatment manual (i.e., the Big Book). Furthermore, the two 
mindfulness language categories significantly predicted alcohol and other drugs use days.  
 Moore and Brody (2009) investigated whether changes in writing predicted 
mindfulness states. They looked at mindfulness as a unique construct as well as to 
mindfulness facets (i.e., nonjudgmental acceptance, observing and describing present 
stimuli, and acting with awareness). Participants wrote about a traumatic event or daily 
events over three days. Correlations between baseline mindfulness levels and word 
categories in the first day of writing were conducted. Positive emotion words negatively 
correlated with nonjudgmental acceptance, and positively correlated with describing 
present stimuli; self-reference negatively correlated with observing present stimuli. 
Regarding cognitive processing words, increased use of this word category significantly 
predicted increased nonjudgmental acceptance, but this was only true for the traumatic 
condition. Cognitive processing words increases also predicted increases in describing 
present stimuli and overall mindfulness, but only for women. Changes in verb tenses also 
predicted changes in mindfulness: increases in present tense were associated with 
increase in nonjudgmental acceptance, increases in future were associated with observing 
present stimuli, and increases in past and future tenses significantly predicted describing 
present stimuli. In addition, present tense partially mediated the relation between 
nonjudgmental acceptance and the writing conditions (those writing about daily events 
scored higher in mindfulness). 
 Although important in advancing our knowledge about the language associated 
with mindfulness, these studies were conducted with specific samples (i.e., participants 
with substance abuse and undergraduate students; Collins et al., 2009; Moore & Brody., 
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2009, respectively) which limits the generalizability of these findings. In addition, Collins 
et al. (2009) did not use a mindfulness measure, but used "mindfulness language" to 
define it, and Moore and Brody (2009) only used one measure of mindfulness. Thus, 
more studies are needed in order to validate the association between language categories 
and mindfulness across different measures. 
The Present Study 
Extant research shows that worry presents as a barrier for experiencing what is 
presented at the present moment. This barrier can be observed in terms of physiological, 
emotional and cognitive features of worry (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Mennin et al., 2002; 
Thayer et al., 1996). However, despite literature suggesting that worry is primarily verbal 
(Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston et al., 1996; Hirsch et al., 2012), our 
understanding of the cognitive pattern involved in worry is still limited. In particular, the 
"internal dialog" characterizing high worriers and worrisome states is still unclear. As 
previously mentioned, having a better understanding of this internal cognitive activity is 
essential in better understanding worry and its theoretical models.  
Mindfulness presents as a contrasting, healthier state in relation to worry, and has 
been found to be an effective treatment for worry (Craigie et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn et al., 
1992). This benefit may be due particularly to openness to present moment experiences 
found in mindful states. That is, mindfulness could serve as an efficient strategy for 
breaking the experiential barrier found in high worriers. Although limited, we have some 
understanding of how changes in physiological and emotional aspects associated with 
worry act as mechanisms of change in mindfulness interventions for worry. However, we 
currently do not know whether and how linguistic aspects associated with worry change 
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in these interventions. Similar to worry, we know little about the internal dialog 
characteristic of mindfulness, especially in what it relates to aspects of the worry models. 
Thus, it would not be possible to establish the cognitive changes necessary to transition 
from a worrisome to a mindful state. 
Given the immediate access it provides into cognitions and emotions, linguistics 
presents as the ideal tool for investigating this internal dialog in worry and also in better 
understanding mindfulness states as a means of elucidating worry, this contrasting 
construct (see figure 2). Through these investigations, we could broaden our 
understanding of theoretical models of worry, and in particular, about how they interact 
and are integrated, which is an area needing particular attention (Behar et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, once the internal dialog is also established for mindfulness states, it would 
be easier to understand the changes that need to occur cognitively to transition between a 
worrisome and a mindful state. That is, cognitive mechanisms of change could be more 
easily identified and investigated. 
Similar to the findings in the emotional and physiological domains which suggest 
that worrisome and mindfulness states are antagonist (Feldman et al., 2007; Mennin et 
al., 2002; Thayer et al., 1996; Vlemincx et al., 2013), it is expected that, indicating their 
contrasting nature, the same language categories derived from worry and mindfulness 
theories will predict both worry and mindfulness states, but with opposite relations to the 
dependent variables. Likewise, worry will present with different proportions of certain 
language categories, compared to a more neutral cognitive activity (i.e., telling a story). 
The following hypotheses follow from this conceptualization. 
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First, given the avoidant nature of worry (Borkovec, 1994), and the acceptance of 
present moment experiences characteristic of mindfulness states (Bishop et al., 2004), it 
was hypothesized that higher worry would be associated with lower use of present tense 
and higher overall number of words, while higher mindfulness would be associated with 
higher use of present tense and lower overall number of words. 
Likewise, based on the intolerance of uncertainty model of worry (Buhr & Dugas, 
2006) and on the curiosity toward different experiences found in mindfulness states 
(Bishop et al., 2004), it was hypothesized that higher worry would be associated with 
higher use of questions, while higher mindfulness would be associated with lower use of 
questions. 
In light of the metacognitive features of worry, which suggest an inflexible and 
rigid focus on worrisome and anxious metacognitions (Wells, 2006) and of a higher-
order, global metacognitive structure proposed in mindful states (Jankowski & Holas, 
2014), it was hypothesized that higher worry would be associated with higher use of 
anxiety-related words, while higher mindfulness would be associated with lower use of 
anxiety-related words. 
Based on findings associating worry and GAD to emotion dysregulation (Mennin 
et al., 2005), and on adaptive emotion regulation strategies characteristic of mindfulness 
(Coffey et al., 2010), it was hypothesized that higher worry would be associated with 
higher use of negative emotion words, while higher mindfulness would be associated 
with lower use negative emotion words. 
Lastly, based on worry and mindfulness theories (e.g., Behar et al., 2009; 
Chambers et al., 2008) and linguistic features (e.g., Molina, 1998; Moore & Brody, 
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2009), it was hypothesized that, as compared to the neutral writing task, the worry 
writing task would elicit lower present tense and higher overall number of words, 
questions, anxiety related words, and negative emotion words.  





Power analyses were conducted in order to determine the necessary sample size. 
G*Power 3.1.3 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) was used to calculate power for all 
the analyses. The correlations between worry scores and the language categories required 
a minimum sample size of 44 participants in order to detect a medium to large effect size 
(r=.40) with an alpha of .05 and a power of .80. A multiple linear regression model 
exploring the effects of the language variables on worry and mindfulness, respectively, 
required a minimum sample size of 34 participants in order to detect a medium effect size 
(f2=.25) with an alpha of .05 and a power of .80. The multivariate repeated measures 
ANOVA comparing effects of the five language categories relative to the worry and 
neutral condition required a minimum sample size of 44 participants in order to detect a 
medium effect size (f2=.25) with an alpha of .05 and a power of .80. Estimated effect 
sizes were based on previous studies examining linguistics and psychopathology 
suggesting medium to large effect sizes (e.g., Geronimi & Woodruff-Borden, 2015), thus, 
most power analyses were conservative. Given the power analyses, an a priori 
recruitment goal of 44 participants was planned. 
Participants 
Participants in the current study included 46 English native speaking adult women 
who ranged in age from 28 to 49 (M = 39.45, SD = 5.46). This study was part of a larger 
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project about familial anxiety and worry; all participants in this sample were mothers. 
The majority of the sample had an annual family income of $60,000 or above. 
Participants were highly educated, and the majority (76%) reported having at least a 
Bachelor's degree. The majority of participants were European American (89%), three 
were African American (7%), and two (4%) self described as "other". For additional 
participant demographics, see Table 1. 
Participants were primarily recruited from local schools, after-school programs, 
mental health agencies, community self-help groups, and other community locations such 
as sport facilities. Though the study was part of a larger project on familial anxiety and 
worry, there were no diagnostic requirements for participation in the current study.  
Procedure 
Individuals who expressed interest in the study were sent an email with 
information about the study and a link to review and sign the consent form and complete 
the questionnaires online through Redcap. Given that the lab tasks and interviews in the 
larger study required a considerable amount of time (i.e., 2-4 hours), completing the 
questionnaires prior to the lab visit reduced the burden during the visit and facilitated 
scheduling. Participants then came to a lab visit for further data collection. The 
administration of the neutral and worry writing tasks was counterbalanced such that half 
of the participants completed the neutral task first, and the other half, completed the 
worry task first.  
Measures 
 Penn State Worry Questionnaire. (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item self-report inventory designed to measure an 
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individual’s tendency to worry excessively. Participants indicate how typical a statement 
is for them using a five-point scale. The measure has been shown to have good internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent validity (Davey, 1993; Molina, 
Borkovec, Davey, & Tallis, 1994). The PSWQ internal consistency in the current sample 
was acceptable (α= .72). 
 The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, 
Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Baer, Walsh, & Lykins, 2009) The FFMQ is a self-report 
questionnaire that measures an individual's propensity to be mindful. Five subscales are 
included in the questionnaire: nonreactivity to inner experience (nonreactivity), 
acknowledging thoughts without responding; nonjudging of inner experincing 
(nonjudging), being nonjudgemental towards thoughts and feelings; observing, the 
propensity to pay attention to inner experience; describe, the propensity to be able to 
label inner experiences; and acting with awareness (acting), attending to what arises in 
the present moment (Baer et al., 2008). The measure has demonstrated excellent 
psychometric properties (Baer et al., 2009); it has been found to be associated to related 
constructs, including thought suppression and openness to experience. Cronbach's alphas 
for the subscales have been in the .82-.91 range in previous investigations (Baer et al., 
2006). Internal consistency ranged from acceptable to excellent in the current sample 
(nonreactivity, α= .87; nonjudging, α= .73; observing, α= .84; describing, α= .93, and 
acting, α= .91). 
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Writing Tasks 
 Worry task. Participants were asked to transcribe their worries so that their 
verbal activity during that period could be assessed. The instructions for this task are 
presented in appendix I. 
After giving directions, the experimenter asked the participants if they had 
questions and left the room. The participants were allowed 10 minutes to transcribe their 
worries. 
 Neutral task. Participants were asked to write a brief composition describing 
something interesting that happened during the last day(s) or week(s). They were given 
10 minutes to complete this task. The instructions for this task are in appendix I. 
After giving instructions, the experimenter asked if participants had questions and 
then left the room.  
 Language analysis. The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC2007; 
Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzalez, & Booth, 2007) computer software was used for 
the linguistic analysis. The LIWC2007 uses a hierarchical model to classify words in 
different word groups (e.g., pronouns, negations). The software generates an output 
containing the frequency of words in each linguistic category. For the purposes of this 
study, present tense, overall number of words, number of questions, anxiety-related 
words and negative emotion words were analyzed. All utterances related to the worry and 
neutral writing tasks were examined separately through the software, creating a frequency 
score for the word categories analyzed by each participant by each writing task. The 
LIWC2007 language categories have been shown to have good internal consistency and 
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external validity (Khan, Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007; Pennebaker et al., 2007; 
Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). 




Preliminary Analyses  
Prior to conducting statistical analyses, all variables were checked for outliers and 
normal distributions. Outliers were defined, for the purpose of this study, as values 
beyond three standard deviations above or below the mean. Further, the multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) assumptions of multivariate normality, linearity of the 
dependent variables relationships, and sphericity were verified, as well as well as the 
regression assumptions of multivariate normality, no multicollinearity, and 
homoscedasticity. Next, the variables of interest were analyzed in relation to 
demographic factors through correlations (for age and income) and a one-way ANOVA 
(for education) in order to determine whether any of the variables significantly related to 
demographic variables.  
 Examination of Model Assumptions. Two participants failed to declare their 
age; given the small percentage (4.34) of those not answering this question and its 
secondary role in the study, no data imputation was conducted (Field, 2013). One outlier 
was found for each of the following categories: anxiety-related words for both the worry 
and neutral conditions, and number of questions. In order to control for possible effects, 
they were replaced by the value of the mean plus three standard deviations (Field, 2013). 
Normality of all study variables was assessed using visual inspection of the histograms 
and skewness examination (with the cut-off of 2.58 due to the small sample size; Field, 
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2013). Number of questions in the worry condition and negative emotion words and 
anxiety related words in both conditions were positively skewed; square root 
transformations were conducted. All subsequent analyses are based on the transformed 
values of these variables. Histograms of all study variables are shown in figures 3 to 15. 
Even after transformation, although skewness was in the acceptable range for all 
variables, the graph for anxiety-related words in the neutral condition still suggested 
skewness. That is, the transformation mostly addressed the skewness related to values 
different than “zero”, however, the square root transformation did not address the large 
amount of “zeros” in anxiety-related words in the neutral condition, which improved 
skewness but did not entirely eliminate it. Thus, analyses involving this variable should 
be interpreted with caution. Other transformation methods (e.g., logarithmic and fraction) 
could not be performed due to the high number of “zeros” in the data. Analyses involving 
linearity were performed using the scatterplots of the variables which indicated largely 
linear, and/or non-curvilinear, relationships between the investigated variables (see 
figures 15 to 18). Similar to the histogram analyses, the linearity scatterplots revealed a 
high number of zeros in the anxiety-related words variable for the neutral condition 
which influenced linearity of this variable in relation to the others. 
 In examining the MANOVA assumptions, Quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plots 
demonstrated that the multivariate normality assumption was met (see figures 19-30). 
Similar to the linearity assumption mentioned above, the assumption of linearity of the 
dependent variables relationships was examined using the scatterplots of the variables, 
which indicated largely linear relationships. The sphericity assumption was met for the 
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"worry-neutral" condition, but not for language category or the interaction, thus, the 
Greenhouse-Geiser test was used, as it does not assume sphericity. 
 Prior to conducting the multiple regressions, assumptions were examined. The 
multivariate normality assumption was met (see above). Despite the high correlation 
found between the predictors (i.e., negative emotion words and anxiety related words, 
r(46) = .89, p < .001), multicollinearity indices still fell within the acceptable limits (VIF 
= 4.67; Tolerance = .21; O’Brien, 2007). Lastly, the residuals versus predicted values 
analysis showed that the data were homoscedastic. 
 Relation Between Study and Demographic Variables. Significant bivariate 
Pearson correlations emerged between age and worry, r(46) = -.36, p = .018; the 
correlations between age and number of words in the worry condition, r(46) = -.30, p = 
.051, and present tense in the neutral condition, r(46) = -.29, p = .060, approached 
significance. No other significant correlations emerged between age and study variables. 
Income was not associated with any of the study variables. Given the aforementioned 
significant association between worry and age, age was entered as a covariate in 
subsequent models involving worry. Further, two One-Way ANOVAs revealed no effect 
of education on worry and mindfulness, Fs < 1.  
Descriptive Statistics. As compared to non-clinical samples (M = 50.74; SD = 
14.79; e.g., Fisak & von Lehe, 2012), women in the present sample (M = 47.72; SD = 
15.97) endorsed similar levels of worry. The women in the current study endorsed 
(numerically) higher levels of mindfulness (M = 132.17; SD = 19.82) than expected in 
comparison to previous community samples. Specifically, psychometric evaluations of 
the FFMQ in normative and predominately non-Hispanic White community women have 
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yielded means around 100.90 (SD = 14.85) for women (e.g., Fisak & von Lehe, 2012). 
Means and standard deviations for all study variables can be found in table 2. 
 Bivariate Correlations Between Worry and Mindfulness. We explored the 
association between worry and mindfulness and compared it to previous studies (e.g., 
Fisak & von Lehe, 2012). Worry and mindfulness were significantly associated, r(46) = -
.55, p < .001. Regarding mindfulness subscales, although observe and describe did not 
correlate with worry, acting with awareness [r(46) = -.30, p = .040], nonjudging of inner 
experience [r(46) = -.51, p < .001], and non reactivity to inner experience [r(46) = -.61, p 
< .001] were significantly negatively associated with worry. Table 3 displays the 
bivariate Pearson correlations between worry and mindfulness, as well as each subscale 
of mindfulness as measured by the FFMQ. 
Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1.  
 Higher worry will be associated with lower use of present tense and higher 
overall number of words, while higher mindfulness will be associated with higher use of 
present tense and lower overall number of words. 
 Two-tailed bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted between worry and 
mindfulness scores, respectively, and present tense for each writing condition. No 
significant associations emerged from these analyses [worry, worry condition r(46) = -
.08, p = .602; neutral condition, r(46) = .18, p = .233; mindfulness, worry condition r(46) 
= .09, p = .538; neutral condition, r(46) = -.10, p = .510] and number of words [worry, 
worry condition r(46) = .23, p = .130; neutral condition, r(46) = .04, p = .784; 
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mindfulness, worry condition r(46) = -.09, p = .547; neutral condition, r(46) = -.04, p = 
.790].  
 Hypothesis 2. 
 Higher worry will be associated with higher use of questions, while higher 
mindfulness will be associated with lower use of questions. 
 Two-tailed bivariate Pearson correlations revealed no association between worry 
and use of questions for either writing condition [worry condition r(46) = .12, p = .434; 
neutral condition, r(46) = .24, p = .100]. Similarly, no association was found between 
mindfulness scores and use of questions in either writing condition [worry condition 
r(46) = .20, p = .174; neutral condition, r(46) = -.25, p = .09]. 
 Hypothesis 3.  
 Higher worry will be associated with higher use of anxiety-related words, while 
higher mindfulness will be associated with lower use of anxiety-related words. 
 Two-tailed bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted between worry and 
mindfulness scores, respectively, and anxiety-related words for each writing condition. 
Worry was significantly correlated with anxiety-related words in the worry condition, 
r(46) = -.44, p = .002, such that those with higher worry tended to use less anxiety related 
words. No association was found, however, in the neutral condition, r(46) = .08, p = .581. 
Further, while no significant relationship was established between mindfulness and 
anxiety-related words in either condition [worry: r(46) = .11, p = .448; neutral: r(46) = -
.06, p = .701], a marginally significant association was found between the nonreactivity 
scale of the FFMQ and anxiety related words, r(46) = .28, p = .059. This pattern was not 
found for the neutral condition, r(46) = .01, p = .988. A similar finding emerged for the 
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nonjudgement subscale, such that a significant association was found between the 
nonjudgement scale of the FFMQ and anxiety-related words, r(46) = .33, p = .024, but no 
association was found in the neutral condition, r(46) = .01, p = .966. These correlations 
revealed that those who scored higher in worry tended to use less anxiety-related words, 
while those higher in mindfulness, nonreactivity and nonjudgement in particular, tended 
to use more anxiety-related words, which contrasts with the study predictions. 
 Hypothesis 4. 
 Higher worry will be associated with higher use of negative emotion words, while 
higher mindfulness will be associated with lower use negative emotion words. 
 Two-tailed bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted between worry and 
mindfulness scores, respectively, and negative emotion words for each writing condition. 
Similar to the findings related to the hypothesis 3, a significant association emerged 
between worry and negative emotion words, r(46) = -.36, p = .014, and nonreactivity and 
negative emotion words, r(46) = .32, p = .028, but only in the worry condition [neutral 
condition, worry: r(46) = .11, p = .481; nonreactivity: r(46) = -.06, p = .701]. Further, a 
slight trend towards significance was found between the nonjudgement scale of the 
FFMQ and negative emotion words in the worry condition, r(46) = .25, p = .090. No 
significant pattern emerged in the neutral condition, r(46) = -.07, p = .642. The 
correlations revealed that those who scored higher in worry and lower in nonreactivity 
tended to use less negative emotion words, while those higher in mindfulness and lower 





   
 
Hypothesis 5. 
As compared to the neutral writing task, the worry writing task will elicit lower 
present tense and higher overall number of words, questions, anxiety-related words, and 
negative emotion words.  
 A multivariate repeated measures analysis of variance, MANCOVA, was 
conducted comparing language use for all language categories during the worry and 
neutral writing tasks.  Two factors, language category (i.e., present tense, number of 
words, anxiety-related words, number of questions, negative emotion words) and 
condition (worry and neutral) were entered in the MANCOVA in order to make it 
possible to test for each word category in each condition, and age was entered as a 
covariate. For the purpose of this study, only the condition effect was relevant. The 
condition effect was significant, F(1, 42) = 7.52; p = .009; partial ɳ2 = .15 (interaction 
term, language vs. condition vs. parent age, F(4, 42) = 7.41; p = .009; partial ɳ2 = .15). 
 Follow up univariate mean comparisons for each condition (worry and neutral 
activity), were conducted using paired-samples t-tests to determine which of the language 
categories separately showed a condition effect. As five comparisons were conducted, 
alpha level was adjusted to .01, according to the Bonferroni correction. There was no 
significant effect of condition for number of words, t(45) = .76, p = .448, and number of 
questions, t(45) = .19, p = .851. However, there were significant differences for anxiety-
related words, t(45) = 6.80, p < .001, present tense, t(45) = 10.63, p < .001, and negative 
emotion words, t(45) = 6.91, p < .001. The worry condition scores were higher for these 
three language categories (means and standard deviations for language variables in each 
57 
 
   
 
category can be found in Table 2). With the exception of present tense, the mean 
differences fell in the expected direction.  
Exploratory Analyses  
 Following correlational analyses, exploratory regressions will be conducted 
predicting worry and mindfulness, separately, from the word categories showing 
significant correlations for each condition, as a way to quantify the amount of variance 
accounted for in both worry and mindfulness by language categories, as well as to 
preliminarily test whether certain word categories uniquely predict worry or 
mindfulness, or whether most of the variance is shared between them in predicting worry 
and mindfulness, respectively. 
 Given the association between worry and age, age was entered as a covariate at 
step 1 of the regression model predicting worry. As language categories were correlated 
with the nonreactivity and nonjudgement subscales of the FFMQ, but not with 
mindfulness, these subscales were used in the following analyses. As the significant 
findings occurred only for the worry condition, only this condition was analyzed in the 
regressions below.  
Worry Regression. Block 1 was significant and age predicted worry scores, F(1, 
42) = 6.08, p = .018; R2 = .13. Block 2 was also significant [F(3, 40) = 5.34, p =.003; R2 
= .29], and language explained an additional 15.95% of the variance in worry. Analyses 
of the contribution of each category separately revealed that negative emotion words (β = 
.06; p = .817) and anxiety-related words (β = -.46; p = .090) were not unique predictors 
of worry, suggesting that most of the variance is shared between these two variables in 
predicting worry. See regression model in table 4.   
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Nonreactivity Regression. The two language categories combined did show a slight 
trend toward significance in predicting nonreactivity scores, F(2, 43) = 2.51, p = .093, 
and language explained 10.46% of the variance in nonreactivity. Analyses of the 
contribution of each category separately revealed that negative emotion words (β = .32; p 
= .271) and anxiety-related words (β = .01; p = .978) were not unique predictors of 
nonreactivity, suggesting that most of the variance is shared between these two variables 
in predicting nonreactivity. See regression model in table 5.   
Nonjudgement Regression. Negative emotion and anxiety words combined 
approached significance in predicting nonjudgement scores, F(2, 43) = 2.77, p = .074, 
and language explained 11.43% of the variance in nonjudgement. Analyses of the 
contribution of each category separately revealed that negative emotion words (β = -.13; 
p = .651) and anxiety-related words (β = .44; p = .125) were not unique predictors of 
nonjudgement, suggesting that most of the variance is shared between these two variables 
in predicting nonreactivity. See regression model in table 6.   
Additional Exploratory Analysis  
Predicting Worry from Mindfulness and Language. Given the established 
association between worry and mindfulness (Fisak & von Lehe, 2012) and the 
elaboration of linguistic hypotheses based on worry and mindfulness theoretical models 
(Behar et al., 2009; Jankowski & Holas, 2014), a regression was conducted in order to 
examine whether language accounted for additional variance in worry, when controlling 
for mindfulness. Given the association between worry and age, this variable was entered 
in the first block. Mindfulness was entered in the second block and language categories 
(i.e., negative emotion and anxiety) were entered in the third block. Age significantly 
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predicted worry scores, F(1, 42) = 6.08, β = -.36, p =  .018. Mindfulness also 
significantly predicted worry, F(2, 41) = 17.35, β = -.58, p <  .001, and explained an 
additional 33.18% of the variance in the model. Language significantly predicted worry 
as well, F(4, 39) = 12.40, p < .001, and language categories accounted for an additional 
10.14% of the variance in worry scores. Analyses of the contribution of each predictor 
separately at block three revealed that the language categories were not unique predictors, 
suggesting that they share variance in predicting worry (anxiety-related words: β = -.19; 
p = .385; negative emotion words: β = -.14; p = .494).




The present study sought to examine the linguistic features associated with worry 
and mindfulness. In particular, the study aimed to investigate whether language features 
derived from worry theoretical models would be associated with worry and mindfulness. 
To achieve this goal, the study examined several specific language categories (i.e., 
number of words, present tense, questions, anxiety-related words, and negative emotion 
words) in relation to worry and mindfulness traits as well as to worry and a neutral 
writing activity.  Several aspects of the proposed association between mindfulness and 
worry and linguistic features were tested. Specifically, it was predicted that present tense 
would be negatively correlated with worry and positively correlated with mindfulness 
and that overall number of words, number of questions, anxiety-related words, and 
negative emotion words would be positively correlated with worry and negatively 
correlated with mindfulness. Further, it was hypothesized that present tense use would be 
lower during worry than during neutral writing, while overall number of words, number 
of questions, anxiety-related words, and negative emotion words would be higher during 
worry than during neutral writing. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analyses revealed that, consistent with previous findings, worry and 
mindfulness were significantly correlated (e.g., Fisak & von Lehe, 2012). Correlations 
between the specific scales of the FFMQ and worry were also conducted. While observe 
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and describe did not correlate with worry, acting with awareness, nonjudging of 
inner experience, and nonreactivity to inner experience were significantly negatively 
associated with worry. This finding is consistent with previous studies and suggests that 
worry is related to the more complex aspects of mindfulness which require elaborated 
cognitive activity (Baer et al., 2006). Mindfulness has been conceptualized as a 
multifaceted construct (Baer et al., 2006). Observe and describe are elementary facets of 
mindfulness through which the individual notices and labels internal experiences (Baer et 
al., 2008). Nonreactivity, nonjudging, and acting with awareness relate to the way in 
which one responds to internal stimuli, and these very responses may be the ones 
debilitated in worry given its avoidant and emotionally dysregulated nature (Fisak & von 
Lehe, 2012; Behar et al., 2009). These results are also consistent with Fisak and von 
Lehe’s (2012) findings and their interpretation that one’s reactions to worry may be more 
closely associated with worry-related symptoms than one’s propensity to notice and 
describe the worry process.  
Hypotheses Testing 
The hypothesis that present tense would be negatively associated with worry and 
positively associated with mindfulness while overall number of words would be 
positively associated with worry and negatively associated with mindfulness was not 
supported. This finding diverges from previous research investigating worry and 
individuals with GAD which suggests a significant role of temporal orientation, 
particularly present tense, in those who worry excessively (Geronimi & Woodruff-
Borden, 2015). In the study conducted by Geronimi and Woodruff-Borden (2015), 
present tense significantly classified those with GAD, such that those higher in worry 
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used less present tense. Our findings of no associations between mindfulness facets and 
present tense also contrast with Moore and Brody’s (2009) study in which increases in 
present tense words predicted increases in the nondjudgemental acceptance feature of 
mindfulness, and this finding applied to both traumatic and daily event themes. Their 
findings suggest that those who focus more on the present moment experience are better 
at being nonjudgemental towards their reality.  
There are a few factors that could have influenced the differences in findings. Our 
two writing tasks were thematically different than theirs (i.e., transcribing worries and 
writing about something interesting that happened versus writing about traumatic 
experiences and daily events). The questionnaires assessing mindfulness were distinct 
(FFMQ versus and The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills, KIMS; Baer, Smith, 
& Allen, 2004) and, thus, the studies were assessing different dimensions of the 
construct. While three scales of these measures share similar underlying features (i.e., 
observing, describing, and acting with awareness), the nonjudgement scale of the KIMS 
(i.e., accept without judgment) has a higher emphasis on acceptance and there is no 
equivalent for nonreactivity in that measure. It is possible that present tense is more 
strongly associated with the subscale accept without judgement of the KIMS used in 
Moore and Brody’s (2009) study than the FFMQ nonjudgement scale because it relates to 
aspects regarding accepting one’s present reality. Further, in their study, narratives were 
collected over three days, and their sample was younger (Mage = 18.88) and included 
males. The prompts in our study may also influence the discrepancy. That is, the neutral 
prompt asked them to think of an event in the past and the worry prompt, although 
discussing a past worry, still seems to invoke a worry that is presently occurring as well.  
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Given the contrasting findings and differences in methodology, future research is needed 
in order to establish the nature of the association between worry and mindfulness and 
temporal orientation. 
The hypothesis that worry would be positively correlated with number of 
questions and mindfulness would be negatively correlated with number of questions was 
not supported. This finding contrasts with the IU model which posits uncertainties are not 
well tolerated by higher worriers (Buhr & Dugas, 2006) and, as a consequence, those 
higher in worry would face more questions. This finding is also discrepant from previous 
research that found an association between GAD and language (Geronimi & Woodruff-
Borden, 2015). However, again, there are considerable differences in the method used by 
these studies that could account for the discrepancy in the results. For instance, in 
Geronimi and Woodruff-Borden’s (2015) study, language samples were extracted from a 
free play interaction between mother and child such that language was expressed in a 
verbal format. No studies have been conducted in regards to the association between 
mindfulness and the use of questions. Similar to the previous hypothesis, future research 
is needed in order to establish the nature of the association between mindfulness and use 
of questions. 
The hypothesis that worry would be positively correlated with anxiety-related 
words and mindfulness would be negatively correlated with anxiety-related words was 
not supported. However, significant findings emerged. First, worry was negatively 
correlated with anxiety-related words in the worry condition. Our original hypothesis was 
based on the idea that, as a consequence of experiencing higher anxiety (Muris, Roelofs, 
Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004), those higher in worry would express more anxiety-related 
64 
 
   
 
words in their worry transcripts. On the other hand, it is possible that those higher in 
worry are using less anxiety-related words as an attempt to avoid experiencing or labeling 
intense emotions (Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000). Originally, this hypothesis was based 
on the metacognitive features of worry and the understanding that worry is defined by an 
inflexible and rigid cognitive activity/style (Wells, 2006). The findings, however, suggest 
that lower use of anxiety-related words could be an attempt to avoid emotional content, 
which would be consistent with the avoidance and emotion regulation worry models. In 
particular, these models conceptualize worry as a strategy to avoid, control, and minimize 
emotional experiences (Menning et al., 2002; Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000). 
Expressing lower emotional content in regards to the worry writing task could be a way 
of accomplishing this goal.  
It is important to emphasize that emotional content interpretations should be 
viewed very cautiously as our method consisted of word count. More precisely, our 
variables are derived from percentages of a word category over the overall number of 
words. While allowing the identification of linguistic patterns, this method is limited as it 
does not take semantics or more qualitative analyses into account. There was also a 
significant positive association between anxiety-related words and nonjudgement as well 
as a marginally significant association between anxiety related words and nonreactivity, 
both in the worry condition. These two mindfulness facets have previously shown the 
strongest associations with worry (e.g., Fisak & von Lehe, 2012); thus, it is not surprising 
that they are the ones with closer associations with anxiety-related words. In particular, 
nonjudging, or taking a nonjudgemental attitude towards thoughts and emotions, and 
nonreactivity, defined as noticing thoughts without reacting to them (Baer et al., 2006, 
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2009), are characterized by welcoming any emotional state, including a negative one 
(Baer et al., 2009).  
It was hypothesized that worry would be positively correlated with negative 
emotion words and mindfulness would be negatively associated with negative emotion 
words. Associations were found between worry and mindfulness and this word category; 
however, these associations were not in the expected direction. More specifically, in the 
worry condition, worry and negative emotion words were negatively associated. This 
hypothesis was primarily based in the emotion dysregulation worry model which 
suggests that high worriers experience more intense emotions (Mennin et al., 2002; Turk 
et al., 2005). Nonetheless, it is possible that as suggested by the avoidance worry model 
(Behar, 2009), worrying is an attempt to avoid experiencing negative emotions and not 
verbalizing them may be one way of accomplishing this goal (Borkovec, 1994). It is 
important to mention that, as with the other language variables, the emotion words 
variable in this study consisted only of the percentage of emotion words in the transcripts 
based on the simple sum of this word category. Thus, any interpretations should be taken 
cautiously and the specific context in which emotions were mentioned was not analyzed. 
Future studies focusing on more qualitative methods should address this important aspect 
of the worry process. Also, contrary to expectations, negative emotion words were 
positively correlated with nonreactivity and the association with nonjudging revealed a 
trend towards significance; these findings were true only for the worry condition. 
Acceptance towards one’s experiences, characteristic of these mindfulness subscales 
(Baer, 2006, 2009), might partially explain these findings and suggest that those higher in 
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this trait may be more comfortable with having cognitive processes characterized by 
negative emotions naturally unfold (Baer, 2003).  
Subsequent exploratory regression analyses also revealed that, after controlling 
for age, anxiety-related words and negative emotion words contributed significant 
variance to worry, although no language variable emerged as a unique predictor. This 
finding might be explained by the fact that these two language variables were also 
correlated and share several commonalities. Further, negative emotion words and anxiety 
related words accounted for a substantial portion of the variance in nonreactivity 
(10.46%) and nonjudgement (11.46), however, this model failed to reach significance.  
The hypothesis that worry activity would differ from a neutral writing activity on 
the proposed language categories was partially supported. First, an overall multivariate 
effect was found for worry versus neutral condition. No effect was detected for number 
of words and questions; however, worry activity was associated with more present tense, 
anxiety-related words, and negative emotion words than the neutral writing activity. 
Although the results related to present tense diverge from those found in Molina et al.’s 
(1998) study, the findings regarding anxiety and emotion words are consistent with their 
study. Molina et al. (1998) found that the worry period had lower present tense use than a 
neutral period. Their study is methodologically considerably different from the present 
study, and this could in part account for these discrepancies. The fact that our neutral task 
consists of writing about an interesting event that happened could have affected temporal 
orientation by the use of more past tense and less present tense in the neutral task, as 
mentioned above. In Molina et al. (1998) study, the neutral task was to “simply think-
aloud.” The present study did, however, concord with Molina et al.’s (1998) findings 
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regarding emotion words as they found that high negative affect statements were higher 
during worry. As opposed to temporal orientation, which may depend on the cognitive 
activity worry is being contrasted with, affect may be a core constituent that is 
consistently salient when worry is contrasted to different cognitive activities. Future 
studies should continue to test affect expression through language in order to validate 
these findings. 
Overall, results provide support for the notion that language expression is relevant 
in understanding worry and mindfulness as traits, similar to previous studies exploring 
psychopathology features and mindfulness as they relate to language expression (e.g., 
Hofmann et al., 2012; Moore & Brody, 2009). The study findings suggest that linguistic 
elements mainly derived from the emotion dysregulation and avoidance worry models 
(Behar et al., 2009) are associated with worry and mindfulness. Interestingly, those 
higher in mindfulness and lower in worry used more negative emotion words and 
anxiety-related words in their worry, a reverse pattern in relation to that found in the 
present study when comparing worry to neutral writing activity. That is, worry as a 
cognitive process had more negative emotion words and anxiety-related words, as 
expected. It appears that those higher in worry and lower in mindfulness use cognitive 
elements associated with worry activity (e.g., negative emotion words, anxiety-related 
words) less often than other individuals, possibly as an attempt to avoid eliciting negative 
affect (e.g., Behar et al., 2009). In contrast, these findings suggest that those higher in 
mindfulness, especially nonreactivity and nonjudgement, and lower in worry appear to 
allow those emotions to occur during the worry process, consistent with mindfulness 
conceptualizations and established associations with worry (Fisak & von Lehe, 2012).  
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Additional Exploratory Analyses  
A regression was conducted in order to examine whether language accounted for 
additional variance in worry when mindfulness was also considered. Language categories 
accounted for a significant portion of the variance in worry scores beyond that explained 
by mindfulness. Anxiety related words and negative emotion words did not, however, 
emerge as unique predictors of worry, which suggest the variance explained by language 
is shared by these categories. Although the proposed language categories associated with 
worry and mindfulness were based on conceptual features of these constructs (e.g., 
Behar, 2009; Fisak & von Lehe, 2012), through this model, it appears that there may be a 
unique quality to language expression that complements the association between worry 
and mindfulness. 
Implications of Linguistic Features for Worry and Mindfulness 
Conceptualizations and Treatment Development 
The results of the current study have important implications on conceptualizations 
of worry and mindfulness. Results suggest that language use is associated with worry and 
mindfulness. Specifically, lower levels of anxiety-related words and negative emotion 
words likely are related to higher levels of worry and lower levels of mindfulness traits in 
female adults who were mothers. Further, worry writing activity, as compared to neutral 
writing activity, shows higher use of present tense, anxiety related words, and negative 
emotion words. Although additional research is necessary to solidify these findings, the 
current study suggests that linguistic elements are important in understanding worry and 
mindfulness. Interestingly, the pattern of language categories (negative emotion words 
and anxiety-related words, in particular) is reversed. That is, while those higher in worry 
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and lower in mindfulness used less negative emotion words and anxiety-related words in 
their worry, the worry writing activity was characterized by higher use of these word 
categories as compared to a neutral writing cognitive activity.  
As mentioned above, this reverse linguistic pattern may indicate avoidance of 
emotions for individuals high in worry/low in mindfulness, and, in contrast, nonreactivity 
or nonjudgement towards emotions for individuals low in worry/high in mindfulness 
(Fisak & von Lehe, 2012). Counterintuitively, the worry of those lower in worry/higher 
in mindfulness, appears to have, linguistically, more elements that constitute the worry 
activity (e.g., anxiety related words; negative emotion words). Future studies should 
continue to investigate linguistic patterns in order to replicate and provide additional 
support to the present findings and more fully explore language as a way to further 
understand worry and mindfulness, both as traits and as states.  
This research could be important in determining clinical applications of 
psycholinguistics. Recent evidence suggests that there may be relevant linguistic markers 
in the treatment of GAD (Dirkse & Hadjistavropoulos, 2015). Dirkse and 
Hadjistavropoulos (2015) found that over the course of internet delivered CBT, the use of 
negative emotion, anxiety, causation, and insight words decreased during therapy 
sessions, whereas past tense use increased. It would also be interesting to analyze 
changes in worry activity language during treatment in order to determine linguistic 
changes in worry as a result of CBT. While Dirkse and Hadjistavropoulos’s (2015) study 
suggests that the use of negative emotion words decreased during the course of treatment, 
it could be found that this same word category increases in worry activity during the 
course of treatment as individuals become less avoidant of their own emotions, similar to 
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the present study findings regarding the worry of those higher in mindfulness and lower 
in worry. As such, once the language associated with worry and GAD is established, 
language analysis could be a complementary instrument in the treatment and assessment 
of worry and GAD.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The current findings are restricted by several limitations. First, worry is a verbal, 
internal mental process (Hirsch et al., 2012) and the simple task of transcribing its content 
could have implications on its ecological validity. That is, transcribing it could lead to an 
involuntary search for terms that would likely not happen when one is just worrying and 
not asked to do it as part of a research project. Similarly, typing could elicit the thought, 
similar to school and work assignments, that there is a correct way of doing it, or an 
appropriate way to worry, undermining the validity of the content. Previous studies 
investigating the language associated with worry or with individuals meeting criteria for 
GAD assessed verbal spoken language (Molina et al., 1998; Geronimi & Woodruff-
Borden, 2015). These studies recognized the possible concerns associated with this 
method, such as the transformation of an internal cognition into purely verbal content. 
However, it is also possible that written language is not the most effective way of 
assessing worry due to the potential drawbacks described above. Further, possibly 
impacting ecological validity is the fact that participants were asked to “worry” during a 
brief period of time whereas worry is usually elicited by internal stimuli (Tallis & 
Eysenck, 1994). Analyzing worry during a limited period of time could have affected the 
ability to capture certain language patterns that are expressed in longer periods. 
Desirability effects in relation to the interviewer or researcher could also interfere in the 
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worry process itself making it less or more intense, for instance. Future studies should use 
methods that assess worry activity closer to its natural manifestation. For instance, worry 
could be recorded, either through speech or written format, in the individual’s 
environment during several days. Preliminary findings from an earlier study indicate that 
worry was correlated with language variables (e.g., negations and future) collected 
naturalistically across seven days in a small sample of adolescents (Geronimi et al., 
2015). Similar investigations with larger samples and across the life span are warranted to 
better understand worry and mindfulness language over time.  
In addition to ecological validity concerns, characteristics of the current sample 
could have affected the results. The current sample was composed exclusively by women, 
mothers, in a limited age range, predominantly European American, and highly educated. 
While worry is more prevalent in women (Robichoud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003), and 
there is a need for better understanding the phenomenon in this population, limiting the 
sample to only women does not allow for gender comparisons. In addition, despite the 
fact that women in this sample endorsed similar levels of worry as compared to non-
clinical samples, they presented with higher levels of mindfulness compared to previous 
findings investigating community samples (Fisak & von Lehe, 2012). Generalizations of 
the current findings to other female populations should be made carefully given that they 
represent a specific subset of this population. Future research should investigate the 
language of mindfulness and worry in a more diverse population. That is, investigations 
should include gender diversity, a wider age range, different educational backgrounds, a 
range of income levels, and more diverse ethnicities.  
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The present study focused exclusively on individuals who had English as their 
native language. The language one speaks influences cognitions (Silva, 2014). Thus, 
investigating worry and mindfulness language cross-culturally might provide important 
information about linguistic elements associated with worry and mindfulness in different 
languages and potentially inform culturally sensitive treatments. 
Finally, as mentioned previously, the quantitative method used to analyze the 
transcripts (i.e., word count) should be interpreted very cautiously. Qualitative methods 
such as semantic/thematic analyzes could address this limitation by the use of coding 
methods targeting specific elements of worry models and mindfulness. In addition, some 
language categories used in this and other studies should also be analyzed taking 
semantics into account and these may capture non-grammatically structured questions, 
for instance. Semantic analyses allow for broader operationalization of word/sentence 
categories which could help detecting speculative language or questions in speech.  
Although the frequency of certain word categories may suggest important linguistic 
patterns, the use of qualitative research will be necessary in further elucidating the 
features associated with worry and mindfulness linguistic features. 
Conclusion 
This is the first study using linguistics to investigate features of worry models 
associated with worry and mindfulness concomitantly. Results of the present 
investigation suggest that word categories related to emotions (i.e., anxiety and negative 
emotion words) hold associations with worry and mindfulness. Number of words, 
questions, and present tense did not reveal an association with worry and mindfulness 
levels in the present sample. Further, compared to a neutral task, worry activity had 
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higher use of present tense, anxiety-related words, and negative emotion words. These 
findings suggest that features of the Avoidance and Emotion Disregulation worry models 
(Behar et al., 2009) are linguistically represented in worry through the use of less 
negative emotion and anxiety-related words by those higher in worry, and a reverse 
pattern occurred for those higher in mindfulness. This finding may reflect avoidance of 
emotional content in those higher in worry and lower in mindfulness and acceptance of 
emotional experience by those lower in worry and higher in mindfulness. Future research 
should continue exploring linguistic features of worry and mindfulness in order to 
establish the relevant linguistic variables associated with these constructs, and, 
concomitantly, explore their clinical applications in evidence-based treatments for worry 
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Variable/Level N %  
Ethnicity   
European American 41 89.13  
African American 3 6.52  
Other 2 4.34  
Education   
High School Diploma 2 4.35  
Some college 5 10.87  
Currently in college or graduate school 3 6.32  
Associate's or equivalent 1 2.17  
Bachelor's Degree 16 34.78  
Masters Degree 11 23.91  
Doctorate 8 17.39  
Income   
$10,000 - $19,000 1 2.17  
$30,000 - $39,999 2 4.35  
$40,000 - $49,999 6 13.04  
$50,000 - $59,999 2 4.35  










Descriptive Statistics of Self-Report and Language Measures 
 
Measure Mean  SD 
Worry 47.72 15.97 
Mindfulness 132.17 19.82 
W. Present tense 16.11 4.06 
W. Number of words 314.43 121.28 
W. Questions 1.34 .50 
W. Anxiety 1.20 .68 
W. Negative emotion 1.75 .61 
N. Present tense 7.98 3.86 
N. Number of words 304.39 108.37 
N. Questions 1.32 .74 
N. Anxiety .39 .47 
N. Negative emotion .94 .58 
Note. W. = worry condition; N. = neutral condition.  
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Table 3  
Correlation Coefficients for Worry and Mindfulness Variables  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Worry --- -
.554** 
-.227 -.276 -.304* .512*** .609*** 
2. Mindfulness  --- .518*** .789*** .750*** .532*** .786*** 
3. Observing   --- .278 .224 -.105 .291* 
4. Describing    --- .512*** .308* .519*** 
5. Acting with 
awareness 
    --- .294* .486*** 
6. Nonjudgement      --- .402** 
7. Nonreactivity       --- 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001; Observing, describing, acting with awareness, 
nonjudgement, and nonreactivity are part of the mindfulness measure used (i.e., FFMQ). 
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Hierarchical Multiple Regression Predicting Worry from Language Variables 
 B SE B β t p 
Model 1   
   Constant 88.66 16.34 5.42 <.001 
   Age -1.01 .41 -.36 -2.47 .018 
Model 2   
   Constant 90.04 17.24 5.22 <.001 
   Age -.80 .39 -.28 -2.04 .048 
   NE Words 1.57 6.73 .06 .23 .817 
   Anxiety-
related words  
-10.61 6.11 -.46 -1.74 .090 
Note. NE = negative emotion. 
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Hierarchical Multiple Regression Predicting Nonreactivity from Language Variables 
 B SE B β t p 
   Constant 16.85 2.64 6.37 <.001 
   NE Words 2.83 2.54 .32 1.11 .271 
   Anxiety-
related words  
.063 2.26 .01 .028 .978 
Note. NE = negative emotion. 
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Hierarchical Multiple Regression Predicting Nonjudgement from Language Variables 
 B SE B β t p 
   Constant 26.77 2.55 10.51 <.001 
   NE Words -1.11 2.45 -.13 -.45 .651 
   Anxiety-
related words  
3.42 2.18 .44 1.57 .125 





















































































Figure 2. Linguistic elements contributing to the “experiential barrier” 
 
  


































































































































































































Worry writing task instructions: 
“What have you most worried about lately? Ok, now we are curious to know about what 
goes through your mind when you are worrying. Just before we start, please pretend you 
are re-experiencing the last time you worried about XXX. Close your eyes and imagine 
yourself in the last time you worried about XXX. Just let the thoughts about XXX 
naturally come to your mind (give participant 1 min). Now what we would like you to do 
is to write the thoughts that go through your mind while you are worrying. Do not worry 
about any typing errors, or even making any sense, since worry is an internal, personal 
activity. You don’t need to write exclusively about your main worry topic, you can write 
about anything that comes to your mind while you are worrying. So this is a brief 
example of the kinds of things you may write about: I am afraid my children will not 
have a good future, will their grades be good to get in a good University?– then the 
worries would continue to go on and on, like in a text. So what we are asking you to do is 
to basically “to transcribe the worries from your mind to the screen”, is that clear? Do 
you have any questions? You will have plenty of time to complete this task. Please make 
sure you include a title in your writing.” 
Neutral writing task instructions: 
"What was the most interesting thing you did in the last days? Ok, now we are 
interested in knowing what you think as you remember this event. Just before we start, 
please pretend you are experiencing that event again. Close your eyes and imagine 
yourself as you experienced that event. Just let the memories about that event come to 





thoughts that go through your mind while you think about that experience. Do not worry 
about any typing errors, or even making any sense, since this is just about your 
experience. You don’t need to write only about [event], you can write about anything that 
comes to your mind as you recall it. So this is a brief example of the kinds of things you 
may write about: I think going to the party on Saturday was fun, what did we have for 
diner? – then the things you think of or remember would continue to go on and on, like in 
a text. So what we are asking you to do is to basically “write what you think about that 
event in the screen”, is that clear? Do you have any questions? You will have plenty of 
time to complete this task. Please make sure you include a title in your writing."   
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